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Racist speech in union representation elections is 
widespread and conflicts with the protections of Title VII for 
diverse employees across different industries.  These messages 
contain slurs, promote white supremacy, and incite fears of 
legal favoritism for Blacks.  Some besmirch Jews, Latinos, 
Japanese, and Mormons.  The rise of white nationalism 
motivates my empirical study of racist speech in union 
representation elections.  My database consists of fifty-one 
National Labor Relations Board cases and twenty-nine 
appellate court rulings on racially divisive campaign speech.  
In addition, the Article examines NLRB cases involving 
picketing employees who voice racial slurs to minority 
workers who cross their line.  The fact findings show that the 
NLRB tolerates almost all slurs and incitements.  The 
Board’s permissive policy conflicts with Title VII’s standard 
for racial harassment under Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.  
This Article suggests that in cases where racist speech is an 
issue, the NLRB should use Title VII’s standard for a hostile 
work environment.  Without making this policy change, the 
National Labor Relations Act opens the door for white 
nationalists to promote racial preference and re-segregation 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Legal Importance the Research Question 
Does the National Labor Relations Act1 (NLRA) 
protect racist speech by employees?2  This Article finds that 
the National Labor Relations Board (also called NLRB, or 
Board) often tolerates these messages.3  My data come from 
cases involving campaign speech in union representation 
elections.4  This Article also examines a smaller number of 
cases involving racist speech on picket lines during labor 
disputes.5  Here, too, the NLRB often rules that employees 
engage in protected concerted activity when they voice racial 
slurs.6  This Article concludes that the NLRB should afford 
                                                          
1  The National Labor Relations Act, July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 1, 49 
Stat. 449; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I, § 101, 61 Stat. 136 (also called 
NLRA). 
2  Throughout this Article, I use “racist” and “racially 
inflammatory” to describe different types of speech in my study. I employ 
both terms because speech varies in content and tone. One example of 
racist speech appears in Detroit Newspaper Agency, 342 N.L.R.B. 223, 268 
(2004) (discussed infra note 222), where a striker who blocked a worker’s 
car shouted, “You fuckin’ bitch, nigger lovin’ whore.” That is racist, in my 
view.  A less crude form of speech that I label as racially inflammatory 
appears in N.L.R.B. v. Bush Hog, Inc., 405 F.2d 755, 757, n.2 (5th Cir. 
1968) (employer made statement that union donated funds to further 
racial integration). For a comprehensive study that bundles these types of 
speech under the single heading “racist speech,” see Mari J. Matsuda, 
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. 
L. REV. 2320, 2321 (1989) (proposing formal criminal and administrative 
sanctions as “appropriate response[s] to racist speech”). 
3  See infra Part III.B.  
4  See infra Part III.A. 
5  See infra Part IV.D. 
6  See infra Part IV.D. Section 7 of the NLRA provides employees 
the right to engage in “concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2014). 
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less legal protection for racist speech by adopting Title VII’s 
standard for hostile work environment.7   
There are three justifications for my proposal.  First, 
these NLRB rulings undermine Title VII’s prohibition of 
racial harassment.8  This means that if employers discipline 
employees who use racist speech in these campaigns, 
employers face an unfair labor practice ruling or a re-run 
election under the NLRA.9  Second, racist speech is more 
pervasive.10  NLRB policies shelter the type of racist speech 
that occurred when workplaces were formally segregated.11  
This approach is outdated and conducive to exploitation by a 
                                                          
7  See infra Part V. 
8  See infra Part IV.D. 
9  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 
703, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17) 
(2014) (also called Title VII).  
10  Monica Stephens, Geography of Hate: Geotagged Hateful 
Tweets in the United States, Humboldt State University, 
http://users.humboldt.edu/mstephens/hate/hate_map.html# (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2017). The map was based on all geo-coded tweets in the United 
States from June 2012 to April 2013 that contained hate words such as 
“fag,” “nigger,” and other offensive terms.  See also Pete Burnap & 
Matthew L. Williams, Us and Them: Identifying Cyber Hate on Twitter 
across Multiple Protected Characteristics, 5:11 EPJ DATA SCI. (2016) 
(adapting algorithms for spotting online religious hate to identify hate on 
the basis of race, disability, and sexual orientation).  
Against this backdrop of the broad prevalence racist speech on 
Twitter, I note that black employees comprise a significant minority of 
employees represented by labor unions. Gerald Mayer, Union Membership 
Trends in the United States, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE (Aug. 31, 2004), at 
CRS-14 (available online at 
https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&co
ntext=key_workplace).  
11  Part I.B, infra, elaborates on the history of labor unions with 
racial segregation and racist speech. For example, compare a 1950 case 
(Happ Bros. Co., Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 1513 (1950), where employer 
representative told an employee, “Don’t you know if you all get the union 
up here you’ll be sitting up here by niggers?”) and a 2006 case (Airo Die 
Casting, 347 N.L.R.B. 810, 811 (2006), where an employee screamed at a 
black employee, “fuck you, nigger”). 
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new generation of white supremacists.  Third, NLRB speech 
doctrines have unwittingly opened the door to form whites-
only labor unions.12  Some cases in this data set protect pro-
union messages that promote white worker interests.  No 
federal law—in this case, the NLRA—should offer a platform 
to re-segregate the American workplace. 
The NLRB’s permissive speech doctrine is rooted in 
its broad interpretation of protected concerted activity under 
the National Labor Relations Act.  To fulfill the purposes of 
this labor law, Section 7 provides employees a right to 
engage in “concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”13  Today, the 
NLRB applies this law to contexts that lawmakers never 
imagined in 1935—for example, when employees post 
comments on social media.14  One problem, however, is that 
digital platforms are used for racist tweets, Facebook posts, 
and emails.15  The NLRB should narrow its speech doctrine 
for representation elections and concerted activity by 
denying protection to speech that expresses racial animus.  
 
B. Motivation for the Research Question: Re-
Emerging White Supremacy 
                                                          
12  See infra Part II.A–Part II.B.  
13  29 U.S. Code § 157, NLRA, supra note 6. 
14  See Christine Neylon O’Brien, The Top Ten NLRB Cases on 
Facebook Firings and Employer Social Media Policies, 92 OR. L. REV. 337, 
346–48, 372, 375 (2014). See also Three D LLC d/b/a Triple Play Sports 
Bar & Grille v. N.L.R.B., 629 F. App’x 33 (2d. Cir 2015) (employer rules 
prohibiting negative communication on social media about management 
violated right of employee to “like” Facebook message by a co-worker that 
unfavorably commented on the store owner’s failing to withhold taxes 
properly).  
15  E.g., Michael H. LeRoy, #AcademicFreedom: Twitter and First 
Amendment Rights for Professors, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 158, 164 
(2015); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and Social Media, 44 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 147 (2011); and Alexander Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech: 
Offense Versus Incitement, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1145, 1166–73 (2013). 
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White supremacy has returned to America’s 
mainstream. As the Ku Klux Klan formed and grew in the 
aftermath of the Civil War, they organized mob actions16 and 
terror campaigns.17  Blacks were targets, but so were their 
white sympathizers.18  Congress held hearings to consider 
                                                          
16  See the account of Rep. Luke Poland—a proponent of the Ku 
Klux Klan Act of 1871—summarizing testimony of a white man from Ohio 
who taught in a Mississippi school for freed slaves: 
While thus quietly pursuing his duties the house 
where he lived was one night surrounded by a 
large body of armed and disguised men; he was 
taken by them from his bed in his night-clothes, 
and in that condition to a swamp at some 
distance and terribly beaten. He succeeded in 
escaping with his life. I asked him what they 
said to him, and what reason, if any, they gave 
for the act. His answer was, ‘All they said to me 
was that ‘they would learn me not to come to 
Mississippi to make niggers as good as white 
folks.’’ 
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 494 (May 30, 1872). 
17  See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 493 (May 30, 1872): 
It was perfectly clear upon all the evidence 
taken by the committee that the secret 
organization known popularly as the Ku Klux, 
but having really various other names, was set 
up for the purpose of keeping the negroes in a 
state of subjection to the old southern rebel 
element…. The strength of numbers in which 
the Klans generally rode, armed to the teeth, the 
bloody work they often made, were quite enough 
to excite the fears of braver and less defenseless 
people than the poor freedmen of the South, but 
probably their horrible and ghostly attire by 
midnight torchlight was as potent of influence as 
their lashes or their pistols.  
18  See Gen. George Thomas’s report, CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 
1st Sess. 284 (Apr. 4, 1871): 
Violence is openly talked of. The editorials of the 
public press are such as to create the most 
intense hatred in the breasts of ex-rebels and 
their sympathizers. The effect of this is to cause 
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legislation to combat Klan violence.  Many witnesses 
described the extreme terror inflicted by white 
supremacists.19  By the 1870s, the Ku Klux Klan’s 
effectiveness was thwarted by a combination of military and 
court actions.20  The group re-emerged, however, in the early 
1900s in response to Thomas Dixon’s racist trilogy that 
romanticized the Klan.21  
The Ku Klux Klan sought to segregate the work of 
black people, a group whom they viewed as suited only for 
menial agricultural labor.22  For the first half of the 
twentieth century, labor unions co-opted this ideology in 
                                                                                                                             
disturbance throughout the State [Tennessee], 
by inciting the ruffianly portion of this class of 
citizens to murder, rob, and maltreat white 
Unionists and colored people. 
19  See the testimony of a white man, John Dunlap, describing how 
disguised Klansmen attacked him and a black man named James Franklin 
on July 4, 1868: “They then had Franklin undress himself, and then 
blindfolded him, and they then whipped him with what I supposed to be a 
leather thong, each one of their number striking him five strokes apiece, 
and then left him to return to his home.” CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st 
Sess. 288 (Apr. 4, 1871). Dunlap was also whipped and ordered to leave 
town on the following Monday. Id. In Nashville, the Klan accosted Dunlap 
again, “when about sixty disguised men, armed and mounted, rode into the 
public square, hallooing they wanted Dunlap and fried nigger meat.” Id. 
20  See Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, Hatred and 
Profits: Getting under the Hood of the Ku Klux Klan, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, NBER WORKING PAPER 13417 (Sept. 2007), at 1, 
available in file:///C:/Users/m-leroy/Downloads/SSRN-id1014794.pdf.  
21  I refer to THOMAS DIXON, THE LEOPARD’S SPOTS (1902), THOMAS 
DIXON, THE CLANSMAN (1905), and THOMAS DIXON, THE TRAITOR (1907). A 
movie in 1915, The Birth of a Nation, further popularized the Klan. 
Evidence of the Klan’s political prominence appears in a rally of 35,000 
robed Klansmen in Washington, D.C. in 1925. See Philip Bump, The Day 
the Ku Klux Klan Took over Pennsylvania Avenue, WASH. POST (May 6, 
2016) (embedding Washington Post coverage of the KKK’s rally on August 
8, 1925).  
22  Rory McVeigh, Structural Incentives for Conservative 
Mobilization: Power Devaluation and the Rise of the Ku Klux Klan, 1915–
1925, 77 SOC. FORCES 1461, 1476 (1999). 
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bylaws that mandated whites-only or segregated locals.23  By 
the 1940s, however, labor’s segregationist practices were 
challenged.  The Supreme Court created a union’s duty of 
                                                          
23  W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE NEGRO AMERICAN ARTISAN 87–95, 100 
(1912), citing many examples from a national survey of labor unions. A 
sample includes: Gardeners’ Protective Union (no Negro members; and 
officer responded, “I have never heard of a good Negro gardener”); 
Machinists’ Helpers and Laborers’ Union of Washington, Indiana 
(contracts with employers had language not to hire “any Negroes or foreign 
men for twenty years”); Order of Railway Conductors of America 
(membership limited to ‘any white man’); Cutting, Die and Cutter Makers 
(‘Nothing doing on the Negro’); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and 
Engineermen (bylaws and constitution deny membership to Negroes); 
International Brotherhood of Boiler Makers, Iron Ship Builders and 
Helpers of America (‘There is a future for the race but it must not be forced 
on the white race’); American Wire Weavers’ Protective Association 
(“admits only white males”); The Paving Cutters’ Union of the United 
States and Canada (‘the white man will not, especially those in the South . 
. . tolerate the Negro to be on the same level as himself’); Waycross, 
Georgia, Trade and Labor Assembly (secretary believes that “Negro 
workers are ‘treacherous and unreliable’”); Georgia Federation of Labor 
(some locals ‘absolutely bar Negroes from membership’); Trade Assembly 
of Fort Worth, Texas (in skilled crafts, ‘Negroes have not been admitted’); 
Federation Labor Union of Dallas, Texas (barring all Negroes due to 
‘ingrained prejudice towards anything that looks to the members like an 
approach towards social equality’); Marshall, Texas, Trades and Labor 
Council (Negroes ‘cannot . . . stick as union men; will scab in spite of all 
that can be done’); Central Labor Union of Miami, Florida (“admitting 
Negroes has a ‘tendency to lower wages and self-respect of white 
mechanics and casts a stigma of association’”); Labor Assembly of Lawton, 
Oklahoma (no Negro members and reporting, “‘we are not troubled with 
them to any extent’”); Temple, Texas (“‘Nearly all men raised south of 
Mason and Dixon’s line do not want to give the Negro any chance to 
become expert mechanics.’”); Teachers’ Union of San Antonio, Texas 
(barring all Negroes, reporting that such membership is “‘unthinkable 
because it means social equality which saps the foundations of race 
purity’”); Texas State Federation of Labor (“It is generally understood that 
the white trades unions of Texas do not admit colored people to 
membership,” and furthermore, that the “Negro is marked with a color 
that distinguishes him from other poor working men”); and Emporia, 
Kansas, Trades and Labor Council (no Negro members; “Negroes should be 
treated white but kept separate.”). 
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fair representation.24  This legal duty was used on a case-by-
case basis to abolish formal segregation in labor unions but 
did not address the Ku Klux Klan’s societal influence.25  
The Klan’s malignant ideology is back and appeals to 
many identity groups.   White supremacy has its own racial 
music,26 internet sites,27 code language for bigotry,28 warped 
                                                          
24  Graham v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 
232, 239 (1949) (union of railroad firemen deprived blacks employment 
and seniority solely because of race); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. 
Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202–03 (1944) (white union entered into agreement with 
railroads to promote only whites as engineers, set a cap on employment of 
blacks, and gave the union a right to further restrict employment of 
blacks); Bhd. of R. R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 773 (1952) (white 
union threatened railroad with strike unless the company signed an 
agreement to discontinue all train porter positions). 
25 See discussion of Brandenburg v. Ohio, infra notes 135–137. 
26  See Robert Futrell, et al., Understanding Music in Movements: 
The White Power Music Scene, 47 SOCIOLOGICAL Q. 275 (2016), analyzing 
how Aryan music fosters a sense of purpose and belonging to people who 
practice racial exclusion. Popular groups are Aggravated Assault, Bully 
Boys, Max Resist, The Hooligans, and Skrewdriver. Id. at 282. Common 
types of music include “techno and Aryan folk genres” including 
“fundamental doctrines common to most movement groups: Aryan 
nationalism, whitepower, race war, anti-Semitism, anti-immigration, anti-
race-mixing, and white victimization.” Id. at 281. See also BETTY A. 
DOBRATZ & STEPHANIE L. SHANKS-MEILE, WHITE POWER, WHITE PRIDE!: THE 
WHITE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1997), reporting that 
WPM (White Power Music) draws participants from the KKK, Christian 
Identity sects, neo-Nazis, and Aryan skinheads.  
27 See Working Class Skin Heads, FACEBOOK (June 6, 2016), at 
https://www.facebook.com/WCSHSodaCity/?hc_ref=PAGES_TIMELINE&f
ref=nf [https://perma.cc/87NS-DTCU], stating: “This community is based 
on those who earn their living. Those of us who scrape by to take hone our 
slice of the dream. We are not slaves, we are not robots we are hard 
working people who know that something earned is something to be proud 
of.” 
28 See Ku Klux Klan, Klan Glossary, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW 
CENTER, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-
files/ideology/ku-klux-klan [https://perma.cc/JZ7H-FNBB]. The hidden 
nature of Klan-speak is demonstrated by terms such as SAN BOG (“A 
password meaning “‘Strangers Are Near, Be On Guard.’”) and KIGY! (“A 
password meaning “‘Klansman, I greet you!’”).  
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connection to Christianity,29 and blood-and-soil justification 
for racial separation.30  While part of the white supremacy 
movement is not visible to the public, other elements display 
racially-themed crosses at a state capitol31 and participate in 
state adopt-a-highway litter programs.32  This background 
provides context for my research question and findings. 
 
II. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: CAMPAIGN 
SPEECH AND ELECTIONS 
A. Overview 
                                                          
29  Peterson v. Wilmur Commc’ns, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (E.D. 
Wis. 2002). 
30  Wotan’s Reich, Why We Blood Oath (Aug. 29, 2015), at 
https://positivethoughtproject.blogspot.com/2015/08/why-we-blood-
oath.html [https://perma.cc/RW92-28YN], explaining: 
Through our blood we carry the integrity of our 
ancestors. It is up to us to honor this integrity by our 
actions and deeds...and yes to an extent our words. When 
we swear an oath upon our blood we are affecting our 
hamingja, that “‘Guardian’” and “‘Luck’” that gets passed 
on through the generations of our Folk. What we swear 
an oath too is equally important, because you can swear 
to something that isn’t worthy of you. 
See also Southern Poverty Law Center, Matthew Heimbach, “I Hate 
Freedom,” Traditionalist Youth Network (July 7, 2013), available in 
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-
files/individual/matthew-heimbach [https://perma.cc/PVE2-PP5B], (stating 
“‘This is our home and our kith and kin.’”).  
Racial separation is advocated in National Alliance, What Is the 
National Alliance, White Living Space, available at 
https://natall.com/about/what-is-the-national-alliance/ 
[https://perma.cc/WP6K-YBX9] (stating, “We must have White schools, 
White residential neighborhoods and recreation areas, White workplaces, 
White farms and countryside. We must have no non-Whites in our living 
space, and we must have open space around us for expansion.”). 
31  Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (Ku Klux Klan not 
barred by First Amendment’s Establishment Clause from erecting its cross 
in holiday display at state capitol).  
32  See discussion, infra note 149. 
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This study is set in the context of collective 
bargaining, a legal framework for union-management 
relations.  The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 
enacted in 1935, provides employees a right to form a union, 
bargain over wages, hours, and terms and conditions of 
employment, and engage in concerted activity for their 
mutual aid and protection.33  Concerted activity involves 
traditional union activities—for example, strikes.34  But this 
right also applies to expressive conduct, such as verbal 
confrontations in labor disputes.35 
Concerted activity also includes employee messages in 
support of a union.36  The NLRA prohibits employers from 
discriminating on this basis.37  Specifically, pro-union 
communication is treated under the NLRA as an essential 
step to establish a formal bargaining relationship with an 
employer.  Some unions may ask employers to voluntarily 
recognize them, leading to negotiations for a collective 
bargaining agreement that covers wages and other terms of 
employment.38  Unions often are the party who petitions the 
                                                          
33  29 U.S.C. § 157, NLRA, supra note 6.  
34  N.L.R.B. v. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. 221, 233 (1963) (“Section 7 
guarantees . . . include the right to strike.”). 
35  See Chi. Typographical Union No. 16, 151 N.L.R.B. 1666, 1669 
(1965) (“One of the necessary conditions of picketing is a confrontation in 
some form between union members and employees.”). Concerted activity is 
not protected, however, when picket line conduct “may reasonably tend to 
coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of rights protected under 
the Act.” NMC Finishing v. N.L.R.B., 101 F.3d 528, 531 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(citing Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1046 (1984), enf’d, 
765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
36  The Supreme Court gave substance to this right in Republic 
Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793 (1945), finding that an employer’s 
rule prohibiting employees from wearing union buttons violated the 
Section 7 right to form a union. 
37  This prohibition is enforced under Section 8(a)(1) which 
prohibits interference, restraint, and coercion; and Section 8(a)(3), which 
prohibits discrimination in the form of discouraging union membership. 
See Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 233.   
38  See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Communication Breakdown: Reviving 
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NLRB for a representation election; and in the past decade, 
the number of these elections have ranged between 1,330 
and 1,614.39  A union must obtain a majority of the votes to 
become the bargaining agent.40 
This background demonstrates the importance of 
campaign communication.  Employee messages are broadly 
protected, including picketing.41  Employers also have a right 
to express their views about unions.42  Often, companies 
                                                                                                                             
the Role of Discourse in the Regulation of Employee Collective Action, 44 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1091, 1129 (2011) (unions seek voluntary recognition in 
over 80% of organizing drives but employers often reject this offer).  
39  NLRB, Representation Petitions—RC (Elections held by fiscal 
year: 2008 (1614); 2009 (1335); 2010 (1571); 2011 (1398); 2012 (1348); 2013 
(1330); 2014 (1407); 2015 (1574); and 2016 (1396), available in 
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data/petitions-and-
elections/representation-petitions-rc [https://perma.cc/3T8T-AU34].  
A much smaller number of elections result from employer 
petitions—for example, when more than one union seeks representation. 
In the past ten years, the range of these elections has varied from 13 in 
2013 to 60 in 2011. See NLRB, Employer-Filed Petitions—RM (Elections 
held by fiscal year: 2008 (25); 2009 (16); 2010 (13); 2011 (60); 2012 (14); 
2013 (13); 2014 (15); 2015 (22); and 2016 (24)), available in 
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data/petitions-and-
elections/employer-filed-petitions-rm [https://perma.cc/5B4H-2PKS]. 
40  John W. Thomas Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 226, 229 (1955).  
41  See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), striking down 
state law that prohibited all picketing at an employer’s premises. 
However, courts have upheld some limits on picketing. E.g., Cox v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965), rejecting the idea that “patrolling, 
marching, and picketing on streets and highways” are on the same 
constitutional footing as “pure speech.” The NLRA allows some types of 
picketing and boycotts. E.g., N.L.R.B. v. Retail Store Emp. Union, Local 
1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980) (Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA does not 
prohibit all peaceful picketing—for instance, picketing grocery stores in 
order to persuade consumers not to buy Washington apples during a strike 
by orchard workers). 
42  Section 8(c) of the NLRA provides:  
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the 
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, 
graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be 
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the 
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describe negative effects that flow from voting for a union.43  
They talk about plant closures44 and reducing benefits and 
wages.45  They mention that unions force workers to strike,46 
and suggest that choosing a union is futile.47  
Employers may recognize a union voluntarily as a 
bargaining representative.48  But often, they decline a 
                                                                                                                             
provisions of this subchapter [Act], if such expression 
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of 
benefit. 
This provision is interpreted to mean that employers and unions are 
prohibited from making election speeches on company time to groups of 
employees within 24 hours of an election. See Peerless Plywood, 107 
N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953).  
43  N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969). In 
this landmark case, the Court tried to illustrate the line between lawful 
and prohibited employer communication, stating that “an employer is free 
to communicate to his employees any of his general views about unionism 
or any of his specific views about a particular union, so long as the 
communications do not contain a threat of reprisal or force or promise of 
benefit (quote omitted).” Id. This includes a “prediction as to the precise 
effects he believes unionization will have on his company.” Id. However, 
the “prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to 
convey an employer’s belief as to demonstrably probable consequences 
beyond his control or to convey a management decision already arrived at 
to close the plant in case of unionization.” Id. 
44  E.g., N.L.R.B. v. Goya Foods of Florida, 525 F.3d 1117 (11th 
Cir. 2008) 
45  E.g., Golden Eagle Spotting Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 64 (1995) 
(employer’s message that organizing would be futile and lead to regressive 
bargaining from the employer violated the NLRA). 
46  E.g., Pyramid Mgmt. Grp., 318 N.L.R.B. 607 (1995). 
47  E.g., Overnite Transp. Co., 296 N.L.R.B. 669, 671 (1989) 
(employer violated the NLRA by making threats that voting for a union 
would be futile).  
48  E.g., Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583 (1966) 
(employer may voluntarily recognize a union if there is demonstrated 
support from a majority of employees). In the construction industry, see 
John Deklewa & Sons, 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1387, n.53 (1987), enf’d. sub 
nom, explaining that where an employer voluntarily recognizes employees 
by checking union authorization cards signed by the employees, a union 
can become a bargaining representative through a subsequent NLRB 
election or clear showing of majority support. This is called a “valid card 
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union’s evidence of majority support.49  In some cases, they 
raise doubts about the validity of authorization cards.50  
When an employer declines to recognize a labor organization, 
this group may file a petition with the NLRB for a 
representation election.51   
This is the background for my empirical study.  The 
NLRB’s overriding policy is to promote free choice when 
employees vote in representation elections.52  Its lodestar is 
whether speech interferes by threatening or coercing 
employees.53  
                                                                                                                             
majority.” Id.  
49  E.g., Grismac Corp. 205 N.L.R.B. 1108, 1118 (1973) (in a 
proposed bargaining unit of 83 employees, where union presented 41 
signed authorization cards, employer could lawfully decline to recognize 
union because two cards were signed by terminated individuals [union 
argued that two other people, determined no longer to be employees, 
should be counted in the proposed unit]).  
50  E.g., Bookland, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 35 (1975) (employees were 
told that signing a card only meant they approved the union staying in 
touch with them). It is also a union unfair labor practice when a union 
offers to waive union initiation fees for employees who sign an 
authorization card. N.L.R.B. v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973). 
51  See Section 9(c)(1)(A) of the NLRA.  
52  See N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) 
(scope of employer expression must be weighed against rights of the 
employees to associate without employer coercion).   
53  Speech is evaluated as to whether “the words themselves or the 
context in which they are used … suggest an element of coercion or 
interference.” Midwest Stock Exchange, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 635 F.2d 1255, 
1267 (7th Cir. 1980). In regulating employer speech, it is common for the 
NLRB to consider if it created a fearful climate— for example, threats 
directed at employees or their employment. E.g., N.L.R.B. v. Browning-
Ferris Indus. of Louisville, Inc., 803 F.2d 345, 347–49 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(factors include whether a threat is vague or specific, isolated or part of a 
pattern, and communicated by a person with authority).  
The NLRB also regulates employee speech to ensure that it does 
not interfere with free choice. More latitude is given to speech by a co-
worker than by a union agent. See Beaird-Poulan Div., Emerson Elec. Co. 
v. N.L.R.B., 649 F.2d 589, 594 (8th Cir.1981), and N.L.R.B. v. Bush Hog, 
Inc., 405 F.2d 755, 1269 (5th Cir. 1968). Potentially coercive speech by 
union officials are subjected to greater review by the NLRB. A clear case of 
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B. The NRLB’s Policies on Racist Speech 
The NLRA does not specifically regulate speech for 
representation elections.  Initially, the law did not even 
provide elections to determine majority support for a union.  
Following the Taft-Hartley Act, which amended the NLRA in 
1947, employees or employers could petition for a 
representation election.54  A year later, the NLRB announced 
in General Shoe Corp. a permissive speech policy: votes 
would not be put aside unless coercive speech interfered with 
the desires of employees to choose freely whether or not to 
have a union.55  However, this approach did not address race 
appeals in elections, even though some campaigns were 
referendums on maintaining segregated workplaces.56  As 
the civil rights movement gained momentum, the Board in 
Sewell (1962) announced a policy to limit racially 
inflammatory campaign messages.57  About twenty years 
later, the NLRB issued several decisions showing its 
ambivalence, stating a policy of setting elections in 1978,58 
and returning to a more permissive policy in 1982.59  During 
this flip-flop, Sewell remained in effect: it served as a racist 
speech filter on top of General Shoe’s lax regulatory hand. 
But as this Article shows below in the research findings,60 
                                                                                                                             
employee coercion appears in N.L.R.B. v. Georgetown Dress Corp., 537 
F.2d 1239,1241 (4th Cir. 1976), where the union’s in-plant organizing 
threatened and harassed co-workers who would not support the union. 
54  Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 
9(c)(1), 61 Stat. 143. 
55  General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948), enf’d 192 F.2d 504 
(6th Cir. 1951). 
56  E.g., Happ Bros. Co., Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 1513 (1950); American 
Thread Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 593 (1949). 
57  See discussion, infra note 102. 
58  General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978). 
59  Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982). 
60  Infra, Part III.B. 
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the NLRB’s racist speech policy has existed more on paper 
than in its application.  
1. No Policy (1935–1947) 
Racism in the workplace was pervasive in the years 
and decades leading up to the following NLRB cases.61  
Nonetheless, in the early years of the NLRA the Board 
turned aside complaints about racial segregation.62  The 
NLRB’s earliest cases involving racial remarks during a 
union organizing campaign occurred during the end of World 
War II.63  By this time, hopes were rising for integrated 
workplaces.  President Franklin Roosevelt’s Executive Order 
No. 8802 required all federal contractors to end racial 
segregation in their workplaces.64  This directive started a 
slow process of integrating workplaces.  Desegregation was 
expanded by executive orders in the 1950s and 1960s, 
requiring federal contractors to promote equal employment 
                                                          
61  E.g., Robert J. Norrell, Caste in Steel: Jim Crow Careers in 
Birmingham, Alabama, 73 J. OF AM. HIST. 669 (1986), recounting the 1908 
organizing attempt of Tennessee Iron and Coal Co. in Birmingham, 
Alabama by an all-white union. The company offered to “put all of the 
‘niggers’ on one side of the mill, and on the white men on the other side” as 
a means to end a strike. Rejecting the offer, the union counter-proposed 
that the company “discharge all the niggers.” Id. at 671. See also Booker T. 
Washington, The Negro and Labor Unions, 111 THE ATL. MONTHLY 756 
(June 1913) (blacks could be hired only to break strikes by white workers).   
62 Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, Inc., & Bethlehem Steel Co., 53 
N.L.R.B. 999 (1943) (Board approved representation petition from union 
that had separate auxiliary local for blacks); Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 62 
N.L.R.B. 973 (1945) (Board was “unable to agree that the segregation into 
separate locals is, per se, a form of racial discrimination in violation of . . . 
the Fifth Amendment”); and Larus & Bros. Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945) 
(Board found that it lacked authority to pass upon racial eligibility 
requirements for membership in a labor organization). 
63 Compare Edinburg Citrus Ass’n, 57 N.L.R.B. 1145, 1156 (1944) 
(“If the CIO comes in the Mexicans will soon have your job.”) with Bibb 
Mfg. Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 338, 358 (1949) (“You can join the union if you want 
to work with Negroes.”). 
64 Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941), Point 2. 
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opportunity65 and affirmative action.66  These actions may 
have encouraged lawsuits against recalcitrant unions to end 
segregationist practices.67 
                                                          
65 President Eisenhower was the first president to issue an 
executive order that used the term “equal opportunity,” connoting a duty 
not only to refrain from prohibited discrimination, but “to promote full 
equality of employment opportunity.” Exec. Order No. 10,479, 18 Fed. Reg. 
4899 (1953) (policy preamble). 
66  President Kennedy’s Executive Order 10,925 continued the 
progression of presidential regulation of employment discrimination. For 
the first time, a presidential order used the term “affirmative action.” 
Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961) (policy preamble).  
67  Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(prior to 1961, company had exclusively black jobs and exclusively white 
jobs); Long v. Ga. Kraft Co., 455 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1972) (local union 
segregated 190 members in an all-white local, and 80 members in an all-
black local); Local 53 of Int’l Ass’n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos 
Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (mechanics union refused 
to consider minorities for membership); Local Union No. 12, United 
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 
368 F.12, 19 (5th Cir. 1966) (union opposed racial desegregation of shower 
and toilet facilities); Oliphant v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & 
Enginemen, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958) (union bylaws expressly included 
only white members); Syres v. Oil Workers Int’l Union, Local No. 23, 223 
F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955) (after international union of combined its white 
and black locals unions, its bargaining committee negotiated racially 
segregated seniority lines); United States v. Local 638 Enter. Ass’n of 
Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler, Pneumatic Tube, Compressed Air, 
Ice Machine, Air Conditioning & Gen. Pipefitters, 360 F. Supp. 979 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (union engaged in a work-referral system that 
discriminated against nonwhites, including admitting 156 white members 
and no black members in 1972); United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal 
Lathers Int’l Union, Local Union 46, 328 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) 
(union with 1,500 members in 1968 represented only four blacks); Hicks v. 
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 310 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. La. 1970) (union 
unlawfully maintained separate locals for whites and blacks); Dobbins v. 
Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968) (union with a history 
of excluding nonwhites perpetuated effects of racial exclusion); United 
States by Clark v. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-
CIO, CLC, 282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1968) (white local union 
discriminated against black employees); Haynes v. Louisiana Teachers 
Ass’n, 381 So.2d 849, 850 (1980) (consolidation of predominantly black 
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The early cases in my sample (1935–1947) involved 
allegations that an employer committed an unfair labor 
practice under the NLRA.68  In these cases, the NLRB 
mentioned but did not analyze racial comments because it 
had no policy on campaign speech.  In other words, when the 
NLRB ruled against employers in cases involving racist 
speech, there was a broader pattern of managerial 
interference with the right of employees to join a union.  
In these cases, employers appealed to white workers 
to reject a union to avoid working with blacks and other 
minorities.  For example, the company president in Reeves 
Rubber told workers that if the plant had union 
representation the workplace “would be run by Negroes from 
Los Angeles and Mexicans from San Juan Capistrano.”69  A 
shop foreman in S.K. Wellman Co. told two employees that 
“if the C. I. O. got in the plant, it would be fulla negroes.”70  
In Planters Manufacturing Co. a superintendent pressured 
an employee to quit a union by criticizing him for joining a 
group that admitted blacks as members.71  He admonished 
employees to avoid the union or they “would be replaced by 
negroes.”72  
                                                                                                                             
teachers’ organization and white counterpart ended 70 years of racially 
separate teacher organizations); Thorman v. Int’l All. of Theatrical Stage 
Emp. & Moving Pictures Mach. Operators of U.S. & Canada, 320 P.2d 494 
(Cal. 1958) (black union members, confined to auxiliary local, were 
required to pay a working fee to the white union while being denied 
employment security enjoyed by whites); Williams v. Int’l Bhd. of 
Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders & Helpers of Am., 165 P.2d 903 (Cal. 
1946) (international union admitted blacks if they consented to 
segregation in separate locals); and James v. Marinship, 155 P.2d 329 
(Cal. 1944) (union required blacks to join an “auxiliary” that denied them 
full membership to the white local). 
68  These violations are set forth in §158, Sections 8(a)(1)-(5) 
(unfair labor practices by employer). 
69  60 N.L.R.B. 366 (1945). 
70  S.K. Wellman Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 214, 215 (1943). 
71  Planters Mfg. Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 735, 744 (1938). 
72  S.K. Wellman, 53 N.L.R.B. at 225. 
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Employer race baiting took other forms.  A 
superintendent in Edinburg Citrus Ass’n tried to convince 
employees that a vote for the union would benefit Mexican 
workers at their expense.73  The company president in Fred 
A. Snow Co. punctuated his questioning of an employee 
about his union activities by stating, “You don’t look like a 
German or a Jap but you act like one.”74  Sometimes, 
however, race appeals went the other way, intending to 
persuade black workers to reject unions.  The general 
manager in Arcade Sunshine Co. told black workers that the 
union was of “no service to the black face” and therefore 
deserved to be rejected.75  
 
2. “Laboratory Conditions” in General 
Shoe (1948–1962) 
In 1947 the Taft-Hartley Act, amending the NLRA, 
provided employers a right of free speech.76  The new law 
also created a category of unfair labor practices committed by 
                                                          
73  Edinburg Citrus Ass’n, 57 N.L.R.B. 1145, 1157 (1944). A 
superintendent reportedly told an employee: 
You are going to get so many Mexican boys in this Union, 
Mexican laborers in this Union that you are going to have 
so many in there that they will have a majority . . . When 
they vote for something, what ever one of the Mexican 
boys votes for, the rest of them is going to vote for that, 
and the first thing you know they will be ruling the 
Union and will be trying to take your job. 
74  41 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1292, n.2 (1942). 
75  12 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (1938).  
76  Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. 
No. 101, § 8(b)(4)(A)–(C), 61 Stat. 136, 141-42 (hereinafter Taft-Hartley 
Act). Congress enacted Section 8(c) in response to NLRB rulings that 
severely restricted employer speech during representation elections. See S. 
REP. NO. 105 on S. 1126, 1 LEG. HIST. OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS ACT 1947, 429–30 (1948) (“The committee believes these 
[Board] decisions to be too restrictive . . . .”).  
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unions.77  These developments affected cases with racially 
inflammatory appeals. 
The NLRB’s first policy on campaign speech was set 
forth in General Shoe.78  The employer disparaged the union 
during an organizing campaign, but there was no promise of 
benefit or threat of reprisal—nor any racial message.79  
Nonetheless, the company’s heavy-handed tactics “went so 
far beyond the presently accepted custom of campaigns 
directed at employees’ reasoning faculties that we are not 
justified in assuming that the election results represented 
the employees’ own true wishes.”80  The decision set forth a 
two-step review.  The Board acknowledged the challenge of 
measuring coercive influence in campaign speech, and said 
the “question is one of degree.”81  To make its task easier, the 
Board also said it would only intervene where conduct is “so 
glaring that it is almost certain to have impaired employees’ 
freedom of choice.”82 
Applying the first step, the NLRB considered whether 
campaign speech rose to the level of an unfair labor 
                                                          
77  These violations are set forth in §158, codified in Sections 
8(b)(1)–(7) (unfair labor practices by labor organization). 
78  General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948), enf’d 192 F.2d 504 
(6th Cir. 1951). A common example of coercive speech is an employer 
threat to close a plant if employees vote for a union. For an insightful 
explanation of the Board’s two-step review, see Comment, Labor Law 
Reform: The Regulation of Free Speech and Equal Access in NLRB 
Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 763–64 (1979). 
79  General Shoe, 77 N.L.R.B. at 125–27. The day before the 
representation election, the company president called employees into his 
office in groups of 20-25 people. He read a harsh anti-union address to 
them. The company also sent supervisors to employee homes to give a pro-
company viewpoint. The NLRB concluded that the company “went so far 
beyond the presently accepted custom of campaigns directed at employees’ 
reasoning faculties that we are not justified in assuming that the election 
results represented the employees’ own true wishes.” Id. at 127.  
80  Id.  
81  Id. at 126.  
82  Id.  
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practice.83  Next, it reviewed the disputed campaign speech 
to ensure that the election was conducted as “a laboratory in 
which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as 
nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires 
of the employees.”84 
Thus, General Shoe put the NLRB in the posture of 
regulating campaign speech.  From 1948 through 1962, 
roughly half of the NLRB rulings disallowed racial 
messages.85  Following the pattern from 1935–1947, most 
cases involved bigoted speech against blacks.  For instance, a 
supervisor in Happ Bros. Co. told an employee, “Don’t you 
know if you all get the union up here, you’ll be sitting up 
here by niggers?”86  In American Thread Co., a 
superintendent told a worker, “You will work side by side 
with Negroes sharing the same rest rooms.”87 Company 
propaganda in Bibb Manufacturing Co. promoted the idea of 
preserving racial segregation.  Its newspaper said that a 
labor group “would force white girls to use the same rest 
rooms and restaurants as Negro girls and penalize white 
girls who refuse to work under Negro overseers, and Negro 
                                                          
83  Id. at 125. 
84 In this instance, the Board concluded that the employer 
“created an atmosphere calculated to prevent a free and untrammeled 
choice by the employees.” Id. at 126.  
85  In my research, I encountered a wide variety of fact patterns, 
often involving a mix of disputed conduct and speech (e.g., interrogation of 
employees regarding support of a union, as well as use by employers or 
workers of racist appeals in a representation campaign). Most of these 
cases raised the issue whether to certify elections results, though some 
involved the issue of whether certain conduct or speech rose to the level of 
an unfair labor practice. In reporting data from these diverse contexts, I 
have combined cases where either election results were not certified or an 
unfair labor practice was found, and use the term “disallow” to reflect 
adverse NLRB rulings. 
86 Happ Bros. Co., Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 1513 (1950). 
87 American Thread Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 593, 601 (1949) (“You will 
work side by side with Negroes sharing the same rest rooms.”). 
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second hands.”88  A foreman reinforced this prejudice to 
persuade an employee not to join a union.89  There were 
times, however, when an employer engaged in race baiting 
but avoided an adverse Board ruling.  Sharnay Hosiery Mills, 
Inc. did not overturn an election where the company mailed 
employees an account of the union’s efforts to promote racial 
integration.90 
Unions also stooped to racist appeals.  In a contest 
between two unions to represent workers at a particular 
company, a devious union hired blacks and whites to hand 
out leaflets to employees.  They hoped to dupe workers into 
believing that the rival union favored integration.91  The 
NLRB set aside the election, not on grounds of racial animus, 
but fraud.92  
The Board’s mixed record from 1948–1962 in treating 
racist speech was due to a refinement to its General Shoe 
policy.  In The Liberal Market,93 the NLRB loosened its 
speech monitoring approach, stating that elections “do not 
occur in a laboratory where controlled or artificial conditions 
                                                          
88 Bibb Mfg. Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 338, 358 (1949) (newspaper 
circulated by the company said that a labor group “would force white girls 
to use the same rest rooms and restaurants as Negro girls and penalize 
white girls who refuse to work under Negro overseers, and Negro second 
hands.”).  
89 82 N.L.R.B. 338, 358 (1949). The foreman told the employee “he 
could join the Union if he wanted to work with Negroes.” Id. at 377. The 
NLRB found that this appeal “was another obvious attempt to raise the 
race prejudice among white employees in order to discourage membership 
in the Union by creating the economic threat that Negro employees would 
be allowed to hold positions then reserved for white employees.” Id.  
90 120 N.L.R.B. 750 (1958). The letter correctly reported that the 
Union contributed $75,000 to the NAACP and submitted legal briefs to the 
Supreme Court to promote racial integration. The NLRB refused to vacate 
the election because the Company’s communication contained no 
misrepresentation, fraud, or coercion.  
91  Kelsey-Hayes Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 151(1960). 
92  Id. at 153 (where fraud and trickery occur, conditions for a 
proper election do not exist). 
93  108 N.L.R.B. 1481 (1954).  
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may be established.”94  The Board added that the actual facts 
must be assessed “in the light of realistic standards of 
human conduct.”95  This more permissive approach guided 
the Board in Paula Shoe Co. 96  The NLRB upheld a union 
election even though the labor organization’s handbill said, 
“If you want to avoid that the Jew Sandler continue to 
mistreat you, vote for UTM (sic).”97  The NLRB minimized 
the significance of this message, reasoning that “mere 
mention of a racial or religious issue is not grounds for 
setting aside an election.”98  The Board added that union 
elections are marked by emotional appeals and hyperbole.99  
3. Sewell (1962) and Midland Life 
Insurance Co. (1982) 
Until 1962, the NLRB did not have an explicit policy 
for racist speech.100  When racial issues arose over campaign 
                                                          
94  Id. at 1482. 
95  Id.  
96  121 N.L.R.B. 673 (1958). 
97  Id. at 676. 
98  Id. N.L.R.B. v. Silverman’s Men’s Wear, Inc., 656 F.2d 53 (3d 
Cir. 1981), overruled by Paula Shoe Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 673 (1958).  
99  Schneider Mills, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 390 F.2d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 
1968) (en banc), denying enf’t to Schneider Mills, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 982 
(1966). The NLRB certified the election results for the Union, even though 
the Union’s campaign message compared the Company president to Hitler. 
The court, disagreeing with the NLRB, said that this comparison 
“interjected into the election one of the most sordid episodes of modern 
history, with all of its overtones of religious persecution.” Id. at 379. The 
court continued, “such propaganda was of a highly inflammatory nature 
and was manifestly not germane to the issues at stake in the election.” Id. 
at 380.   
100  Leading up to Sewell Manufacturing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 
(1962), the NLRB also set aside some elections due to racial coercion but 
lacked a structured framework for making these judgments. E.g., 
Associated Grocers of Port Arthur, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 468, 474 (1961) 
(overturning election results that favored the employer in part to 
“intimidating the existing Negro complement” of employees with the 
prospect of white replacements for them if the union won). See also 
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messages, the Board used broad criteria for unfair labor 
practices from 1935-1947 and the “laboratory conditions” 
doctrine after General Shoe.  This changed, however, in 
Sewell Manufacturing Co., a case where the Board set aside 
an election because the employer repeatedly used racial 
integration as a divisive message.101  The Sewell Board said 
that “appeals to racial prejudice on matters unrelated to the 
election issues or to the union’s activities are not mere 
‘prattle’ or puffing.  They have no place in Board electoral 
campaigns.”102  
Sewell has remained in effect since 1962.  In a series 
of conflicting rulings, however, the Board has alternated 
between regulating election speech that is based on 
misrepresentations and maintaining a hands-off approach.  
Decided the same year as Sewell, Hollywood Ceramics Co., 
said that elections would be set aside if campaign 
information contained significant misrepresentations.103  
This approach did not specifically address racially themed 
messages, though prejudicial speech is often a 
misrepresentation.  The Board reversed course in Shopping 
Kart Food Market, Inc., holding that it would no longer set 
                                                                                                                             
Granwood Furniture Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 1465 (1961). 
101  Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962). The employer 
extensively communicated racially charged messages to employees. One 
example involved newspaper pictures “purportedly showing white labor 
leaders dancing with Negro women and an unidentified Negro man 
dancing with a white woman, above a caption reading ‘The CIO strongly 
pushes and endorses the FEPC.’” Id. at 66–67. The NLRB found “the 
challenged propaganda has lowered the standards of campaigning to the 
point where it may be said that the uninhibited desires of the employees 
cannot be determined in an election.” Id. at 71. In Sewell-type cases, the 
Board may order a new election. See Zartic, Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 495, 496 
(1994). 
102  Sewell Mfg., 138 N.L.R.B. at 71. The Sewell court added that 
racially inflammatory appeals “inject an element which is destructive of 
the very purpose of an election. They create conditions which make 
impossible a sober, informed exercise of the franchise.” Id. 
103  140 N.L.R.B. 221, 224 (1962). 
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aside elections based on misrepresentations,104 but then 
reverted to the Hollywood Ceramics standard in General 
Knit of California, Inc.105  These alternating policies dealt 
with campaign messages in general, not racist speech.  
Eventually, the Board in Midland National Life Insurance 
Co. (1982) settled on a hands-off policy allowing voters to 
separate truth and fiction, reality and distortion, puffery and 
honesty.106  
To summarize, since the Taft-Hartley Act the Board 
has conducted representation elections.  Campaign speech by 
employers and unions is filled with hyperbole, much like 
American political elections.  For the past thirty-five years, 
the NLRB has taken a laissez-faire approach to speech in 
these elections.  Paradoxically, however, its policy in Sewell 
set a standard for prohibiting appeals to racial prejudice.  
                                                          
104  228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1313 (1977). 
105  239 N.L.R.B. 619, 620 (1978). 
106  In Midland National Life Insurance Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 
133 (1982), the NLRB returned to the Shopping Kart standard, stating “we 
will no longer probe into the truth or falsity of the parties’ campaign 
statements, and . . . will not set elections aside on the basis of misleading 
campaign statements.” This policy removes “impediments to free speech by 
permitting parties to speak without fear that inadvertent errors will 
provide the basis for endless delay or overturned elections.” Id. at 132.  
More generally, the burden to overturn an election has remained 
high, even where racial animosities are involved, because an “election by 
its nature is a heated affair.” N.L.R.B. v. Halperin Distrib. Corp., 826 F.2d 
287, 290 (4th Cir. 1987). The Board will overturn an election only if “an 
atmosphere of fear and coercion rendered free choice impossible.” Id.  Even 
when that burden is met, the party who communicated a racial message is 
allowed to prove that its message was truthful and germane. Family Serv. 
Agency S.F. v. N.L.R.B., 163 F.3d 1369, 1378–79  (D.C. Cir. 1999) (union’s 
use of Spanish as a wedge-issue to win over Hispanic vote while alienating 
black employees was relevant to its campaign, even if inflammatory). A 
judge in another case noted, “Only the successful propagandist need 
concern us” in deciding whether a racially provocative statement is part of 
an election. N.L.R.B. v. Bancroft Mfg. Co., Inc., 520 F.2d 1406, 1407 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (Gee, J., concurring).  See generally Comment, 
Charlotte LeMoyne, The Unresolved Problem of Race Hate Speech in Labor 
Union Elections, 4 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 77 (1993).  
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Thus the question to explore is whether—and to what 
extent—the Board has taken action in campaigns where this 
speech occurs. 
 
III. RESEARCH METHODS AND FINDINGS: RACIST 
MESSAGES IN NLRB ELECTIONS 
 My research parallels methods used in similar studies 
on discrimination within labor law.107  The closest 
comparison is Paul Frymer’s research.108  In 2005, Frymer 
explored evidence of racism in labor union elections by 
examining NLRB and federal appeals court cases.109  His 
study was based on 150 cases from 1935–2000.110 Mine is 
limited to seventy-seven cases from 1938–2015.  However, 
Frymer did not report how he selected cases, nor did he list 
these cases; and he presented statistical findings in text 
without data tables.  
I explain my study’s methodology,111 include an 
appendix of cases,112 present data tables,113 and report 
                                                          
107  Michael Jordan, The NLRB Racial Discrimination Decisions 
1935-64: The Empiric Process of Administration and the Inner Eye of 
Racism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 55 (1991); Karl E. Klare, The Quest for 
Industrial Democracy and the Struggle Against Racism: Perspectives from 
Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 157 (1982); Lawrence F. 
Doppelt, Employer Racial Discrimination: Reviewing the Role of the NLRB, 
8 J. L. REFORM 453 (1974); James M. Hughes, Allocating Jurisdiction Over 
Racial Issues Between the EEOC and NLRB: A Proposal, 54 CORNELL. L. 
REV. 43 (1968); and Douglas L. Leslie, Government Action and Standing: 
NLRB Certification of Discriminatory Unions, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 35 
(1974). 
108  Paul Frymer, Racism Revised: Courts, Labor Law, and the 
Institutional Construction of Racial Animus, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 373 
(2005). 
109  Id. at 374. 
110  Id.  
111  Infra Part III.A. 
112  Infra Part VI. 
113  Infra Part III.B. 
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specific fact findings.114  Frymer and this Article reach 
similar conclusions about the NLRB’s permissive treatment 
of racist speech in union elections.115  But our inquiries differ 
in key respects.  Since 2005, white nationalism has become a 
major force in American culture and politics.  My study 
captures the raw, internet-mediated expressions of white 
nationalism in a way that was not possible even a decade 
ago.116  These social media platforms are a potent outlet for 
racist communication that could be part of union 
representation elections.  
The most immediate distinction is my comparison of 
NLRB racist speech cases to comparators under Title VII,117 
and to unjust dismissal laws that employees use to challenge 
employers who fire them for racist speech.118  My 
conclusion—that the NLRB’s toleration of racist speech 
undercuts hostile work environment standards in Title VII—
supports earlier studies that flagged this concern as long as 
40 years ago.119 
                                                          
114  Infra Part III.B. 
115  Frymer, supra note 108, at 384–85. 
116  Id. at 373–74, assumed that the study of racism through a 
psychological lens was incomplete and also assumed that racist speech and 
actions were strategic behaviors. While he examined NLRB and court 
rulings to examine these assumptions, he did not explore specific 
illustrations of white supremacist organizations, likely because they were 
less visible without social media in the early 2000s. By comparison, I 
present my findings within the broader milieu of white supremacist 
culture and organizations today. See Futrell, supra note 26; Working Class 
Skins Heads, supra note 27, Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 28; 
Peterson, supra note 29; and Wotan’s Reich, supra note 30. 
117  Infra Part IV. 
118  Infra Part IV. 
119  Doppelt, supra note 107, at 459 (“[T]he NLRB is wrong, as a 
matter of law, in requiring that racial discrimination be ‘inherently 
destructive’ of employee rights under the Act in order to be unlawful”); 
Hughes, supra note 107, at 950 (“[A] method of apportionment must be 
developed under which the Board can continue to prohibit union racial 
practices that substantially undermine the efficacy of the LMRA, and at 
the same time defer to EEOC jurisdiction in matters that are peripheral to 
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A. Sample and Research Methods 
I created a database of NLRB and federal court 
rulings involving racist messages during a union 
representation election.  Using Westlaw’s internet database 
for NLRB cases, I searched for cases with the key words 
“racial” (and its extensions, such as “racially” and “racist”), 
“campaign,” and “representation.”  These words were an 
initial guide. My search led to cases containing campaign 
slurs of Jews,120 Japanese,121 Hispanics,122 and Mormons.123  
I found cases with racist speech in union elections.  
These cases were recorded in a roster. I also explored 
precedents cited by these decisions.  In addition, I keycited 
the cases for additions to the database.  Finally, I examined 
the case history for each NLRB decision to see if a federal 
appeals court also made a ruling related to speech.  
The initial research focused on campaign messages 
from company and union representatives.  Some NLRB cases 
also revealed third-party speakers who communicated racist 
messages during an organizing campaign: co-workers,124 
allies to unions and employers,125 and outsiders.126  I added 
                                                                                                                             
organizational and collective bargaining processes”); and Leslie, supra 
note 107, at 61 (“[W]hen the NLRA accords exclusive representation rights 
to a union that discriminates in membership, it arguably satisfies a 
condition precedent to the union’s existence . . . [but] the Act neither 
passes upon nor enforces the union’s acts of discrimination in 
membership”). 
120  N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 701 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1983). 
121  KI (USA) Corp., 309 N.L.R.B. 1063 (1992). 
122  Family Serv. Agency S.F. v. N.L.R.B., 163 F.3d 1369, 1378–79 
(D.C. Cir. 1999). 
123  Honeyville Grain, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 444 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 
2006) 
124  E.g., Beaird-Poulan Div., Emerson Elec. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 649 
F.2d 589 (8th Cir.1981) and N.L.R.B. v. Georgetown Dress Corp., 537 F.2d 
1239 (4th Cir. 1976) 
125 E.g., N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 701 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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these cases to the database. 
Fact Findings 1–6 are presented in Part III.B, all of 
which pertain to NLRB rulings. Part III.C presents Fact 
Finding 7, relating to appellate court rulings on these NLRB 
cases. Part III.D provides a textual analysis of these 
appellate cases.  
 
B. Data and Fact-Findings 
My sample contained fifty-one NLRB cases decided 
from 1938 to 2015. Federal appeals courts ruled in twenty-
eight of these cases.  Thus, the database has seventy-nine 
legal rulings.  My data presentation is organized in five 
charts.  Following these statistics, this Article reports key 
fact findings. Chart 1 classifies speakers who communicated 
racist messages.  Chart 2 displays how often the NLRB 
permitted racist speech; counts how often a union or 
employer won the ruling; and shows certification outcomes 
for union elections.  Charts 3A and 3B break down NLRB 
rulings by time frames that relate to different NLRB speech 
policies.  In Chart 4, I show whether (1) the ruling affirmed 
an NLRB determination to certify a union or deny 
certification of the election, and (2) the employer’s speech 
was an unfair labor practice before the NLRA had a 
certification process. 
 
                                                                                                                             
126 E.g., Ashland Facility Operations, LLC, 701 F.3d 983 (4th Cir. 
2012). In Ashland, an employer contended that an outside group made 
racially inflammatory remarks that undermined an election that resulted 
in a union victory and certification. The appeals court, applying an agency 
analysis, affirmed the NLRB’s ruling that the comments by a leader of the 
NAACP was not an agent of the union. Id. at 990–91. The court also 
concluded that the NAACP officer’s comments to employees were not 
racially inflammatory. Id. at 992. 
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1. Statistical Findings for NLRB 
Rulings 
 
 Fact Finding 1: In NLRB representation 
elections, an equal number of company and union 
speakers communicated racist messages: Company 
representatives used this type of speech in twenty cases, plus 
two of their allies (total of twenty-two cases).  Similarly, 
union representatives used racist speech in seventeen cases, 
and five of their allies (total of twenty-two cases).  Since co-
workers are viewed by the NLRB and courts as third parties, 
seven cases involving their speech is not analyzed as a form 
of company or union speech.127  
 
                                                          
























Chart 1  
NLRB Representation Elections: 
Speaker of Racist Campaign Speech




 Fact Finding 2: In two-thirds of representation 
campaigns involving racist messages, the NLRB 
allowed this communication (see bars at left, with 
solid shading).128 The NLRB allowed racist speech in 
thirty-five cases (68.6%) compared to sixteen contrary 
rulings (31.4%).  
 Fact Finding 3: Unions won more than three-
fourths of the cases involving representation 
campaigns with racist messages (see middle bars with 
horizontal lines).129 Unions won forty-three cases (84.3%) 
involving racist speech, compared to seven cases (13.7%) 
where the Board disallowed this communication. One case 
produced a mixed outcome (2.0%, not shown). 
 Fact Finding 4: Unions were certified as 
bargaining representatives in four of five cases with 
racist messages (see dotted bars at right).130  Unions 
won thirty cases (58.8%) involving racist speech, compared to 
                                                          
128 Refer to black bars, left. 
129 Refer to bars with horizontal shading, center. 




























Chart 2  
NLRB Rulings on Racist Campaign Speech
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seven cases with contrary rulings (13.7%).  Fourteen other 
rulings (27.5%) involved an unfair labor practice finding or 
an order of a new election, but they were not a ruling on 




 Fact Finding 5: Since 1938, NLRB rulings have 
dramatically changed from disallowing all racist 
messages to allowing most of these communications, 
especially since 1963.  From 1938–1948 (pre-General 
Shoe), the NLRB disallowed racially themed speech in all six 
cases (see black bar near far-left).  But this pattern changed 
during 1949–1962 (General Shoe period), when the NLRB 
only disallowed racist speech in about half of its cases (see 
bars at middle-left in light gray).  Paradoxically, after Sewell 
in 1962 and through 1982—a period when the NLRB 
announced a more rigorous test for racially themed campaign 
messages—the NLRB rarely disallowed these messages (see 
bars at middle right with dotted pattern, indicating one cases 
that disallowed speech and thirteen contrary rulings).  After 



































NLRB Rulings on Racist Messages by Years 
(Bar Chart)
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all forms of campaign speech in 1982 (see bars at far right 
with horizontal pattern), there was no change in outcomes: 
In sixteen cases from 1983–2015, the NLRB allowed racist 
messages and disallowed this speech only twice.  
2. Statistical Findings for Federal 
Appellate Court Rulings 
My sample includes twenty-seven federal appeals 




 Fact Finding 7: Federal appeals courts denied 
enforcement in 9 out of 27 NLRB cases involving 
racist speech, signaling a difference in how courts and 
the Board treat these campaign messages. The period of 
greatest disagreement followed Sewell (1963–1982), when 






























Chart 4  
Appellate Court Review of NLRB Rulings on 
Racist Messages by Years
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rulings (45.5%) on racist campaign messages.131  For NLRB 
rulings from 1938 through 1982,132 federal appeals courts 
reversed seven out of sixteen (43.75%) NLRB rulings that 
allowed racially themed campaign messages.  These 
statistics are inconsistent with the deference that courts 
usually apply to NLRB rulings and orders.133  In the most 
recent period (1983–2016), however, courts affirmed ten out 
of twelve (83.3%) NLRB orders involving racist speech.134  
One ruling, which partially affirmed an NLRB ruling, was 
not included in Table 4.  
IV. RESURGENT WHITE SUPREMACY: EMPLOYER LIABILITY 
UNDER TITLE VII 
In Part IV, this Article demonstrates how the NLRB’s 
permissive treatment of racist campaign messages 
undermines Title VII’s standards for racial harassment.  
Part IV.A shows how white supremacists are enlarging their 
communications, including in workplaces.  This background 
is relevant to my study because it indicates that racist 
speech is more prevalent than my small sample indicates.  
Part IV.B explores cases where employers failed to address 
racist speech.  Under Title VII and related anti-
discrimination laws, employers pay costly judgments or 
settlements.  The main implication of Part IV.B is that racist 
speech harms businesses that ignore or tolerate it.  Part IV.C 
examines cases in which employers disciplined employees 
who communicated racist messages at work—in effect, the 
                                                          
131 Refer to dotted bars (right-center). 
132 Refer to black bars (left), and gray bars (left-center).  
133 See James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective 
Bargaining Protections and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 
939, 965–66 (1996) (analyzing 1,224 National Labor Relations Board 
decisions that were appealed to federal courts). Appellate courts reversed 
only 14.7% of the NLRB cases where a union violated the NLRA. Id. at 
976, tbl.3. 
134 Refer to diagonal bars (right). 
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flip-side of cases in Part IV.B. In these cases, employees sued 
their employers for taking adverse actions on the basis of 
their workplace speech.  Important to note, employers 
usually defended these lawsuits successfully.  Part IV.D 
integrates these sub-parts to explain how the NLRA and 
Title VII subject employers to conflicting speech policies—the 
former promoting free speech even if racist, and the latter 
resulting in monetary damages for permitting racist speech 
when it adversely affects conditions of employment. 
 
A. Resurgence of White Supremacy 
White supremacy has crawled out from the shadows 
into America’s mainstream.  This resurgence is anchored in 
time by a landmark case, Brandenburg v. Ohio.135  A Klu 
Klux Klan leader was convicted under a state criminal 
syndicalism statute for a rally that hinted at violence against 
the federal government.136  That rally, held on a farm,137 was 
repeated on a larger scale in 2017 when armed white 
supremacist groups violently marched through the streets of 
Charlottesville, Virginia.138  After that disturbance, a 
national poll shows that four percent of Americans “mostly 
agree” with white nationalist beliefs.139  
                                                          
135  395 U.S. 444 (1969) (striking down Ohio’s criminal 
syndicalism statute because the law criminalized mere advocacy of 
violence). 
136  Id. at 445. The rally featured a message that the federal 
government was suppressing the white race, and “revengeance” (sic) might 
be an appropriate response. Id. at 446. 
137  Id. at 445. 
138  Hawes Spencer, A Far-Right Gathering Bursts Into Brawls, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-protests-unite-the-
right.html, and Hunton & Williams, FINAL REPORT: INDEPENDENT REVIEW 
OF THE 2017 PROTEST EVENTS IN CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA (Nov. 24, 
2017), at http://www.charlottesville.org/home/showdocument?id=59691 
[https://perma.cc/S3WL-ATUL].  
139  A national poll showed that four percent of Americans mostly 
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On a cultural scale, white supremacists embrace 
racist music.140  They mingle on the internet141 and some 
mask their bigotry in a new style of cultural discourse.142  
Others link their ideology to Christianity.143  A few promote 
racial separation in terms of ancestral blood,144 and kith and 
kin.145  Others advocate “living space”146 and white 
culture.147  
                                                                                                                             
agree with the beliefs of white nationalists. NPR/PBS News Hour/Marist 




ust%2017,%202017.pdf  [https://perma.cc/UR2B-K47D]. 
140  See Futrell, supra note 26 (analyzing how the Aryan music 
scene fosters purpose and belonging to people who practice racial 
exclusion).  
141  See Working Class Skin Heads, post from June 6, 2016 (last 
viewed on Jan. 12, 2018), 
https://www.facebook.com/WCSHSodaCity/?hc_ref=PAGES_TIMELINE&f
ref=nf [https://perma.cc/87NS-DTCU] (“This community is based on those 
who earn their living. Those of us who scrape by to take hone our slice of 
the dream. We are not slaves, we are not robots we are hard-working 
people who know that something earned is something to be proud of.”). 
142   See Mitch Berbier, “Half the Battle”: Cultural Resonance, 
Framing Processes, and Ethnic Affectations in Contemporary White 
Separatist Rhetoric Transforming the Stigma of White Supremacy: The 
Ethnic Affectations of Love, Pride, and Heritage-Preservation, 45 SOCIAL 
PROBLEMS 431, 443–40 (1998) (discussing the new rhetoric of white 
separatists). Courts have been presented with expert testimony on coded 
communication used by white supremacists. E.g., State v. Tankovich, 307 
P.3d 1247 (Idaho 2012) (expert testimony established that the defendant’s 
three-leaf clover tattoo was a common symbol worn by Aryan white 
supremacists). 
143  Peterson v. Wilmur Commc’ns, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014 
(E.D. Wis. 2002).   
144  Wotan’s Reich, supra note 30. 
145  Southern Poverty Law Center, Matthew Heimbach, supra note 
30.  
146  National Alliance, What Is the National Alliance, White Living 
Space, supra note 31. 
147  E.g., white nationalist leader Jared Taylor’s 2016 election 
“robocall” asking voters to support Donald Trump because he would 
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While a portion of the white supremacy movement is 
not visible to the public, other elements seek legitimacy 
through civic activities.  They assert rights to display their 
racially-themed crosses at a state capitol,148 and participate 
in state adopt-a-highway litter programs.149 
 
B. Employer Liability for Racial Harassment: 
High Risk 
In this section, this Article explores white supremacy 
in the workplace.  This Article presents a lengthy catalogue 
of cases to prove that racist speech is not isolated or 
infrequent.  This detailed and extensive documentation 
dispels any notion that the small number of NLRB cases in 
my database reflects the real frequency of racist speech in 
the workplace.  
By way of background, Title VII prohibits several 
forms of employment discrimination.  Most pertinent to this 
study, the law applies to race discrimination.150  Title VII 
                                                                                                                             
promote immigration of “smart, well-educated white people” who can 
assimilate to white America. Peter Holley, Hear a White Nationalist’s 
Robocall Urging Iowa Voters to Back Trump, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2016). 
148  Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (First 
Amendment Establishment Clause does not bar Ku Klux Klan from 
erecting its cross in holiday display at state capitol, where the KKK’s 
application for a permit said its cross is a religious symbol). Cf., Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, Va. Div. v. City of Lexington, Va., 722 F.3d 224 (4th 
Cir. 2013) (city regulation limiting display on public light poles to U.S., 
state and city flags is not unconstitutional).  
149  Robb v. Hungerbeeler, 370 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2004) (Missouri’s 
denial of Klan group’s petition to participate in Adopt-a-Highway Program 
violates First Amendment); Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Ark. State 
Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 807 F. Supp. 1427 (W.D. Ark. 1992) (Klan group 
had constitutional right to participate in state’s Adopt-A-Highway 
Program); and State v. Int’l Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 
788 S.E.2d 455 (Ga. 2016) (state highway department improperly denied 
Klan group’s permit to participate in Adopt-a-Highway program). 
150  The legal doctrine of racial harassment in the employment 
context originates in Rogers v. EEOC, 316 F. Supp. 422 (E.D. Tex. 1970), 
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applies to harassment when it is so pervasive or severe that 
an employee’s conditions of employment are adversely 
affected.151  Administering the law, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) advises employers to 
provide a workplace that is free of racial harassment.152  
Many state discrimination laws supplement Title VII.153 
Isolated harassment, when it becomes extreme, is 
sufficient to expose employers to liability.154  Some 
                                                                                                                             
rev’d, 454 F2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).  
151  Courts use a totality-of-circumstances test to judge whether 
racial harassment is sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute 
discrimination. E.g., Henry v. CorpCar Servs. Houston, Ltd., 625 F. App’x 
607, 611–12 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 
(discussed infra note 228), to a racial harassment complaint (Title VII is 
not a “general civility code,” but applies when extreme conduct is 
“sufficiently severe or pervasive”)). 
152   EEOC Compliance Manual, “Race and Color Discrimination” 
(Apr. 19, 2006), at 35, available at https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-
color.pdf [https://perma.cc/CUQ5-65ZE]. Discrimination includes employer 
toleration of “offensive jokes, slurs, epithets or name calling, physical 
assaults or threats, intimidation, ridicule or mockery, insults or put-
downs, offensive objects or pictures, and interference with work 
performance.”   
153  Cowher v. Carson & Roberts, 40 A.3d 1171, 1175 (N.J. 2012) 
(“Jew Bag,” “Fuck [ ] you Hebrew,” “Jew Bastard,” “Where are [you] going, 
Jew,” “I have friends in high places, not in fucking temple,” “Jew Shuffle,” 
“If you were a German, we would burn you in the oven,” “We have Jews 
and Niggers that work here” are actionable discrimination); and Nazir v. 
United Airlines, Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296 (Cal. 2009) (terminated 
employee of Kuwaiti and Pakistani descent may proceed to trial under 
state discrimination law after being called “sand nigger,” “sand flea,” “rag 
head,” and “camel jockey”). 
154  Ayissi–Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(“being called the n-word by a supervisor … suffices by itself to establish a 
racially hostile work environment”); Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l 
Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 24 (2d Cir. 2012) (“no single act can more 
quickly alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working 
environment than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet such as 
‘nigger’ by a supervisor in the presence of his subordinates”); McGinest v. 
GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004) (“It is beyond 
question that the use of the word “nigger” is highly offensive and 
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illustrations make this concept clearer.  Graffiti, written 
below the name of an African-American employee and 
                                                                                                                             
demeaning, evoking a history of racial violence, brutality, and 
subordination”); Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 817 (9th Cir. 
2001) (the word “nigger” is “perhaps the most offensive and inflammatory 
racial slur in English, ... a word expressive of racial hatred and bigotry”); 
Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir. 2001) (far 
more than a “mere offensive utterance,” the word ‘nigger’ is pure 
anathema to African-Americans”); Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. 
Co., 312 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Perhaps no single act can more 
quickly alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working 
environment than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet such as 
‘nigger’ by a supervisor in the presence of his subordinates”); Daso v. The 
Grafton School, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 485, 493 (D. Md. 2002) (“The word 
‘nigger’ is more than [a] ‘mere offensive utterance’ . . . No word in the 
English language is as odious or loaded with as terrible a history.”); Bailey 
v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (“The use of the word 
‘nigger’ automatically separates the person addressed from every non-
black person; this is discrimination per se.”); and City of Minneapolis v. 
Richardson, 239 N.W.2d 197, 203 (Minn. 1976) (“We cannot regard use of 
the term ‘nigger’ . . . as anything but discrimination . . . based on . . . race . 
. . . When a racial epithet is used to refer to a [black] person . . .  an 
adverse distinction is implied between that person and other persons not 
of his race. The use of the term ‘nigger’ has no place in the civil treatment 
of a citizen . . . .”). 
Other cases require, or suggest, that slurs be repetitious to 
support actionable claims of discrimination. See Amirmokri v. Balt. Gas & 
Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1131 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding a prima facie case of 
national origin harassment because of repeated ethnic slurs uttered 
toward an Arab-American employee); Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 
(10th Cir. 1994) (two racial slurs insufficiently severe because there was 
no barrage of opprobrious racial comments); Boutros v. Canton Reg’l 
Transit Auth., 997 F.2d 198, 204 (6th Cir. 1993) (same); Davis v. Monsanto 
Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988) (repeated slurs are necessary 
to establish a racial harassment claim); Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prod. 
Corp., 772 F.2d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir. 1985) (repeated racial slurs created a 
hostile work environment); McCray v. DPC Indus., Inc., 942 F. Supp. 288, 
293 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (sporadic racial slurs by co-workers fails to establish 
a hostile work environment); Bivins v. Jeffers Vet Supply, 873 F. Supp. 
1500, 1508 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (one-time calling a co-worker a “nigger” fails 
to establish hostile work environment); Bennett v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 
705 F. Supp. 979, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (remark, “hey black bitch, open the . 
. . gate,” does not establish a hostile work environment). 
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stating “kill all niggers,” was sufficiently severe to survive an 
employer’s motion to dismiss a lawsuit.155  In a different 
case, a trial court ruled similarly, reasoning that “the noose 
is among the most repugnant of all racist symbols, because it 
is itself an instrument of violence.”156  Another employer lost 
its motion to dismiss when a black employee’s name was 
written in a workplace shower by an arrow connecting him to 
a burning cross and a KKK sign.157  These cases signify that 
some courts categorically view nooses, references to the 
KKK, and incitements to kill blacks as speech that alters 
conditions of employment. 
While a single incident can create actionable 
harassment, most cases require a pattern of speech or 
expressive conduct.  These types of Title VII cases involve 
displays of nooses,158 graffiti,159 clothing,160 tattoos,161 and 
                                                          
155  See Reedy v. Quebecor Printing Eagle, Inc., 333 F.3d 906, 909 
(8th Cir. 2003) (racially hateful bathroom graffiti that amounted to a death 
threat satisfied the severity element for proof). 
156  Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 820, 824–25 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
157  Jackson v. Flint Ink N. Am. Corp., 382 F. 3d 869 (8th Cir. 
2004).  
158  Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(upholding compensatory damages of $1.32 million for racially abusive 
environment that included noose and derogatory racial terms); Vance v. S. 
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1989) (noose displayed near 
the work station of a black employee); Smith v. Town of Hempstead Dep’t 
of Sanitation Sanitary Dist. No. 2, 798 F. Supp. 2d 443 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(employees alleged display of a noose); Wilson v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Transp., 
No. 01-civ-7398(RJH), 2005 WL 2385866 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (workplace 
permeated with offensive nicknames and noose); and Williams v. N.Y.C. 
Hous. Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 820 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
159   Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 520 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(black employee’s workplace had a noose, racist graffiti, and racial 
intimidation); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 
1986); and EEOC v. Rock-Tenn Servs. Co., 901 F. Supp. 2d 810 (N.D. Tex. 
2012) (racist graffiti and noose on employer’s premises). 
160  E.g., Swartzentruber v. Gunite Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. 
Ind. 2000) (denying religious discrimination complaint of a member of the 
Church of American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan who was ordered to 
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flags;162 racist materials;163 recruitment to white supremacy 
groups;164 racist slurs, epithets, and jokes;165 intimidation of 
                                                                                                                             
cover his forearm tattoo of a hooded figure standing in front of a burning 
cross). 
161 Lawrenz v. James, 852 F. Supp. 986 (M.D. Fla. 1994) 
(corrections officer terminated for wearing a T-shirt with a swastika and 
the words “White Power”). 
162 Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(employer did not violate speech rights of employee who refused to remove 
a Confederate flag from his toolbox after complaint from a black 
employee); Webber v. First Student, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (D. Ore. 
2013) (no violation of bus driver’s First Amendment rights who was 
terminated for refusing to a Confederate flag from his pickup truck which 
was parked on the school district’s property); Carpenter v. City of Tampa, 
No. 8:03-CV-451- T-17-EAJ, 2005 WL 1463206 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (public 
employee displayed Confederate flag on his car); Vanderhoff v. John Deere 
Consumer Prods., Inc., 21 IER Cases 862, 2003 WL 23691107 (D.S.C. 
2003) (no wrongful discharge of employee who displayed a Confederate 
flag decal on his toolbox because it is not a political opinion under state 
law); in re N.Y.S. Law Enf’t Officers Union, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO (State), 694 N.Y.S.2d 170 (N.Y. App. 3d 1999) (corrections officer who 
flew Nazi flag at his home violated work rule). 
163 Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2002) (police officer 
circulated anti-black and anti-Semitic materials); Savina v. Gebhart, 497 
F. Supp. 65 (D. Md. 1980) (school security monitor distributed Ku Klux 
Klan information, and broadcasted racially derogatory remarks over a 
school’s public address system); and Essex Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t. v. Essex 
Cty. Corr. Officers Ass’n, 27 Mass. L. Rptr. 487 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 2010) 
(corrections employees condoned and encouraged racially harassing posts 
to union’s website).  
164  See Lake v. AK Steel Corp., No. 2:03-cv-517, 2006 WL 1158610 
(W.D. Penn. 2006) (workplace was pervaded with racial slurs, epithets and 
graffiti, including swastikas, Ku Klux Klan video, and display of a noose). 
165  Appellate cases include Green v. Franklin Nat’l Bank of 
Minneapolis, 459 F.3d 903, 911 (8th Cir. 2006) (black employees called 
“baboon[s],” “porch monkeys,” “spear-chuckers,” “ghetto assholes,” 
“nigger,” “super nigger”); Webb v. Worldwide Flight Serv., 407 F.3d 1192, 
1193 (11th Cir. 2005) (black employee called “nigger” constantly by 
manager); White v. BFI Waste Servs. LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 298 (4th Cir. 
2004) (employee subjected to racially-oriented degradation); Hrobowski v. 
Worthington Steel Co., 358 F.3d 473, 477, n.2 (7th Cir. 2004) (“the word 
‘nigger’ was used frequently”); Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 
179, 182 (4th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff was called “dumb monkey”); Hollins v. 
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Delta Airlines, 238 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2001) (several hangman’s nooses 
coupled with racist jokes); Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 626 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (supervisors compared African American employees to 
“monkeys,” “slaves”, and “nigger”); Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 
661 (6th Cir. 1999) (workplace filled with racial epithets and racially 
offensive graffiti); Allen v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 
1999) (workplace included racial epithets, slurs, and intimidating symbols, 
including nooses); Jeffries v. Metro-Mark, Inc., 45 F.3d 258, 260 (8th Cir. 
1995) (plaintiff was called a “monkey”); Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life 
Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 673-75 (7th Cir. 1993) (female employee called a 
“nigger”); Brown v. Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 
1993) (“unlike certain age-related comments which we have found too 
vague to constitute evidence of discrimination, the term ‘nigger’ is a 
universally recognized opprobrium, stigmatizing African–Americans 
because of their race”); Daniels v. Pipefitters’ Ass’n Local Union No. 597, 
945 F.2d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 1991) (plaintiffs were called “porch monkeys” 
and “baboons”); Brewer v. Muscle Shoals Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1515 (11th 
Cir. 1986) (school superintendent’s comment that he did not want to 
appoint plaintiff to an administrative position because he did not want to 
see the school system “nigger-rigged” is direct evidence of discriminatory 
animus, even though the comment was made after the alleged violation); 
Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1981) (black employee 
constructively discharged where he was subjected to terms such as 
“niggers” and “spooks”). 
Cases in federal district court include Dapkus v. Chipotle Mexican 
Grill, Inc., 2017 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1009, 2017 WL 36448 (N.D. 
Ill. 2017) (words such as “nigger,” “nigga,” and “gorilla” frequently used); 
McCaslin v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns Mgmt., LLC, 127 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 242, 2015 WL 2365955 (W.D. Mich. 2015); Vital v. Nat’l 
Oilwell Varco, Civ. A. No. H-12-1357, 2014 WL 4983485 (S.D. Tex. 2014) 
(employees called words “nigger,” “gorilla,” and “coonass” on daily basis); 
Burton v. Heckmann Water Res., Civ No. 4:13-cv-880, 2015 WL 1427971 
(M.D. Pa. 2015) (employee repeatedly exposed to terms such as “nigger,” 
“niggahjew,” and other racially derogatory terms); Davis v. Lakeside Motor 
Co., Inc., 117 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1539, 2013 WL 149594 (N.D. 
Ind. 2013) (employee repeatedly called a “nigger”); Market v. Ill. Bell Tel. 
Co., No. 01 C 3841, 2003 WL 22697284 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Fulmore v. M&M 
Transp. Servs., Inc., No. 1:11-cv-0389-TWP-TAB, 2012 WL 5331229 (S.D. 
Ind. 2012) (employee called “nigger,” “black motherfucker,” and subjected 
racially offensive jokes and comments); Wallace v. Platt’s Heating & Air 
Conditioning Co., Inc., C/A No. 2:08–3679–MBS, 2010 WL 427738 (D.S.C. 
2010); Walker v. SBC Servs., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 524 (N.D. Tex. 2005) 
(warehouse workers were called “monkeys”); Colbert v. Infiniti Broad. 
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co-workers on the basis of race;166 and employer condonation 
of bigotry.167  Apart from Title VII, employees also sue under 
state discrimination statutes168 or torts, such as intentional 
                                                                                                                             
Corp., 423 F. Supp. 2d 575 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (manager called used term 
“monkey” in derogatory manner); Sykes v. Franciscan Skemp Healthcare, 
No. 99-c-734-c, 2000 WL 34235984 (W.D. Wis. 2000) (black employee had 
writings such as “nigger” and “nigger go home” in work area); Tillmon v. 
Garnett Corp., 80 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1470, 1999 WL 592119 
(N.D. Ill. 1999) (black employee subjected to recurring racist name-calling, 
noose from co-workers, and swastika etched on his tool box); Briggs v. 
Hannag’s Rest., Inc., No. 95 C 4315, 1997 WL 269597 (N.D. Ill. 1997) 
(numerous references to “niggers” as pimps, drug pushers, and 
prostitutes); LaFleur v. Wallace State Cmty. Coll., 955 F. Supp. 1406, 1416 
(M.D. Ala. 1996) (employee warned to leave down because “in Cullman 
after dark because there used to be a sign at the city limits that read, 
‘nigger, don’t let the sun set on your ass’”). 
State cases include Cutler v. Dorn, 955 A.2d 917 (N.J. App. 2008) 
(Jewish police officer was subjected to supervisor comments about “dirty 
Jews” and other anti-Semitic communications); and Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, 
Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 219, n.4 (Cal. 1970) (“‘nigger’ may once have been in 
common usage” but now is “particularly abusive and insulting”). 
166 Williams v. ConAgra Poultry, Inc., 378 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2004) 
($1.2 million awarded to employee whose workplace had nooses, a black 
doll hung by a noose, and invitations for black employees to attend Ku 
Klux Klan hunting parties where they would be the prey). 
167 Essex Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 27 Mass. L. Rptr. 487; Goldsmith v. 
Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2008) (employer 
toleration of recurring racial hostility results in $500,000 punitive 
damages award); and Lake v. AK Steel Corp., No. 2:03-cv-517, 2006 WL 
1158610 (W.D. Penn. 2006). Condonation can be proved by if co-workers 
use racial slurs, an employee complains, and the employer ignores the 
situation. E.g., Snell v. Suffolk Cty., 782 F.2d 1094, 1103–04 (2d Cir. 
1986); Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prods. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250, 1258 (6th 
Cir. 1985); and Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 
1982). 
168  Philip v. Gtech Corp., 2016 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 233,007, 2016 
WL 3959729 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (employee subjected to racial slurs may 
proceed to trial under state discrimination law, where theories of liability 
are broader than in Title VII); and Marigny v. Mercury Air Ctr., Inc., 2002 
WL 34235964 (Cal. Super. 2002) (Trial Order), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
2003 WL 21978622 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2003) (co-workers and managers 
used the word “nigger” regularly).   
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infliction of emotional distress.169  
Employers who fail to address racial harassment face 
costly judgments and settlements. There is no central 
repository for this information.  To address this 
informational gap, I researched five separate sources to find 
evidence of the high costs of racist speech.  Two sources were 
federal170 and state171 court decisions that published 
                                                          
169  Adams v. Vertex, Inc., Civ. A. No. 04-01026 (HHK), 2007 WL 
1020788 (D.D.C. 2007) (racial slurs can constitute emotional distress); 
Williams v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., No. 3:05-cv-479-J-33MCR, 2006 
WL 2131299 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (jury entitled to decide emotional distress 
claim where employee was subjected to repeated racial slurs and 
threatened with a rope); Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 691 (N.J. 1998) 
(‘“jungle bunny” is patently a racist slur, and is ugly, stark and raw in its 
opprobrious connotation”); Robinson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 183 Cal. 
App. 3d 1108, 1129–30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (supervisor insulting an 
employee with racial slurs is outrageous is a triable jury issue); 
Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local Union No. 238 v. Iowa Civil 
Rights Comm’n, 394 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1986) (award of damages for use of 
racially derogatory terms); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 
1173, 1177 (Wash. 1977) (en banc) (rejecting motion to dismiss because 
racial insults at the workplace could constitute outrageous conduct). But 
see Briggs v. N. Shore Sanitary Dist., 914 F. Supp. 245, 252 (N.D. Ill. 1996) 
(racial slurs and doll insufficient for recovery of emotional distress claim); 
McCray v. DPC Indus., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 384, 391 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (racial 
slurs and jokes by co-employees are not outrageous conduct); Herlihy v. 
Metro. Museum of Art, 633 N.Y.S.2d 106, 114 (App. Div. 1995) (ethnic 
slurs are not sufficiently outrageous or extreme to support emotional 
distress claim). 
170  Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(upholding compensatory damages of $1.32 million for racially abusive 
environment that included noose and derogatory racial terms); Goldsmith 
v. Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2008) (employer 
toleration of recurring racial hostility results in $500,000 punitive 
damages award); and Williams v. ConAgra Poultry, Inc., 378 F.3d 790 (8th 
Cir. 2004) ($1.2 million awarded to employee whose workplace had nooses, 
a black doll hung by a noose, and invitations for black employees to attend 
Ku Klux Klan hunting parties where they would be the prey); MacMillan 
v. Millennium Broadway Hotel, 873 F. Supp. 2d 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(reducing $1.25 million award to $130,000 for voodoo doll and repeated 
references to “nigger”); and Carter v. Chi. Transit Auth., No. 99 C 7738, 
2001 WL 1035712 (N.D. Il. 2001) (award of $300,000 for Title VII 
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damages figures. Two additional sources were media reports 
of large jury awards,172 and monetary settlements in 
discrimination lawsuits.173  EEOC press releases added a 
fifth source to document the cost of racist speech to 
employers.  The agency pursues claims under Title VII for 
                                                                                                                             
violations involving repeated use of racial slurs reduced to no more than 
$100,000). 
171  Lin v. Dane Const. Co., 126 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 974, 
2014 WL 8131876 (N.J. App. Ct. 2015) (affirming award of $25,000 in pain 
and humiliation damages to employee who was subjected to repeated 
racial slurs); Smith v. Superior Prod. LLC, 13 N.E.3d 664 (Ohio App. 2014) 
(involving jury award of $549,307.77 for employee who was subjected to 
recurring racial slurs); and Boone v. City of Lavergne, 111 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1072, 2011 WL 553757 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming 
jury awards of $350,000 and $300,000 to two employees who were 
subjected to racial harassment). 
172  Large verdicts that are reported in news outlets include $16.6 
Million Verdict Against Corona Company in Racial Discrimination 
Lawsuit, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE (June 29, 2017) (employee was called the 
“N” word and other racially offensive names); Kirk Mitchell, Denver Jury 
Awards Nearly $15 Million in Racial Discrimination Case, THE DENVER 
POST (Feb. 11, 2015) (white employees and supervisors of Matheson 
Trucking and Matheson Flight Extenders Inc. often used the N-word when 
referring to black workers); Greg Kocher, 8 Men Awarded $5.3 Million 
from UPS; Effigy Hung from Ceiling, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Apr. 14, 
2016); Pennsylvania State Trooper Wins Nearly $2M in Racial 
Discrimination Lawsuit, NBC10 (Nov. 12, 2014); Bethany Barnes, 
Portland Public Schools, After Expressing ‘Respect’ for $1 Million Verdict, 
Appeals It, THE OREGONIAN (Aug. 22, 2017) (two employees were 
relentlessly subjected to the N-word and noose in the workplace).  
173  Laura Bult, Sara Lee Agrees to Pay $4M to Black Employees 
Who Say They Were Called Racial Slurs, DAILY NEWS (Dec. 22, 2015); 
Chris DiMarco, Top 10 Most Expensive Discrimination Settlements of 2013, 
INSIDECOUNSEL MAGAZINE (July 8, 2014) (Bradley v. City of Richmond 
settled for $1 million in a case brought by eight African-American 
pipefitters who alleged that they were subjected to racial epithets and 
other forms of bias); George Rede, 6 Takeaways from Daimler’s Settlement 
of Discrimination, Harassment Claims in Oregon, THE OREGONIAN (Feb. 5, 
2015); and Tim Gould, Noose, ‘N-word’ Lead to $3.6M Race Discrimination 
Settlement, HR MORNING (Aug. 3, 2016) (New Jersey Transit settled 
discrimination lawsuit with seven employees who were subjected to the N-
word; and a noose was hung over one employee’s neck).  
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workplace speech that constitutes racial harassment.  Table 
7 is the product of EEOC press releases for racial 
harassment cases from 2009–2017.  The table begins with 
the most costly cases for employers. 
Chart 5 
EEOC Settlements & Court Judgments, 2009-2017 
(Ranked by Expense to Employers) 
$14,500,000 Settlement (Patterson-UTI Drilling, 
4/20/2015): Minority Employees Subjected to Racial & 
Ethnic Slurs & Jokes, & Fired for Complaining 
$11,000,000 Decree (YRC/Yellow Transportation, 
6/29/2012): Black Employees Subjected to Nooses, Racist 
Graffiti and Epithets, Harsher Discipline, & Tougher Work 
Assignments 
$8,900,000 Settlement (Albertsons, 12/15/2009): Employees 
Subjected to Swastikas, Lynching Drawings, Epithets, 
White Supremacist, and Anti-Immigrant Comments 
$4,000,000 Settlement (Hillshire Bros. Co., 12/22/2015) 
Blacks Subjected to Racist Comments/Graffiti 
$2,750,000 Settlement  (WRS Compass, 8/27/2012) Black 
Workers Harassed with Nooses & Slurs, Plus Harassment 
of White Workers Who Associated with Blacks  
$2,000,000 Consent Decree (Blockbuster Inc., 12/14/2011) 
Hostile Environment for Female and Hispanic Workers, 
Including Racial Remarks 
$1,200,000 Settlement (Well Servicing Companies, 
12/2/2004): Minorities Verbally Abused and Punished 
$1,073,261 Damages (Whirlpool, 4/1/2011) Verbal/Physical 
Attack Due to Race and Gender 
$1,000,000 Settlement (Elmer W. Davis, Inc., 8/10/2010) 
Black Employees Called “n----r,”  
“lazy n-----rs,” “sambo,” “slave,” “monkey”; Exposed to 
Nooses & Swastikas 
$650,000 Settlement (Race, LLC/Studsvik, 12/31/2009) 
Targeting Black Workers for Higher Radiation Exposure, 
and Subjecting Them to Racial Slurs 
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$630,000 Settlement (Scully Distribution, 8/27/2012) 
Drivers Subjected to Racial Slurs 
$600,000 Settlement (Mercury Air Centers, 8/9/2010) 
Filipino and Hispanics Barraged with Slurs 
$500,000 Settlement (RockTenn Services, 12/3/2012) 
Employees Subjected to Racist Graffiti, Noose, and 
Employer Ignoring of Complaints 
$400,000 Settlement (Big Lots, 2/16/2010) Black Employees 
Subjected to Racial Jokes  
$250,000 Settlement (Swissport Fueling, 12/2/2014) 
Employees Repeatedly Called “Monkeys”  
$243,000 Judgment (A.C. Widenhouse, 3/8/2013) Blacks 
Face Racial Slurs and Nooses, Retaliation 
$228,000 Settlement (Titan Waste Services, 3/14/2014) 
Black Employee Subjected to “N-word,” Discharged 
$180,000 Settlement (Emmert Int’l, 1/7/2013) Employee 
Subjected to Regular Use of “N-Word,” Racial Jokes and 
Retaliation for Complaining 
$150,000 Settlement (Torqued-Up Energy, 5/28/2013) 
Employee Fired for Reporting Racial Slurs 
$122,500 Settlement (Pace Services, L.P., 4/22/2010) 
Muslim, Black and Hispanic Employees Repeatedly called 
“Terrorist,” “Taliban,” “Osama,” “Al-Qaeda,” “n----s,” & “f----
-g Mexicans” 
$120,000 Settlement (Downhole Technology, 4/26/2017) 
Black Employee Fired for Complaining that Co-Worker 
Wore KKK Hood 
$118,000 Settlement  (Professional Building Systems of 
N.C., 4/8/2010) Black Employees Subjected to “n-word,” 
Nooses, and Racially Offensive Pictures 
$150,000 Settlement (Affordable Care, Inc., 6/2/2010) 
Harasser Said He Had KKK Relative 
$100,000 Settlement (McGriff Industries, Inc., 7/1/2010) 
Black and White Employees Routinely Subjected to 
Racially Derogatory Comments, Slurs, and Insults Directed 
at or About African-Americans 
$87,205 Settlement (Mike Enyart & Sons, 10/6/2010) Black 
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Employee Fired After Complaining About Racial Epithets 
and Swastika 
$80,000 Settlement (Mel-K Mgt. Co., 8/28/2015) Blacks 
Subjected to “n----r”, “ho” & “black b----h” 
$50,000 Settlement (OnSite Solutions, LLC, 11/2/2016 
Manager Used Code Language (“Sprinkle a Little Salt”) to 
Fire Blacks and Replace with Whites 
 
When these sources are viewed in totality they 
provide a gauge to estimate the cost of racist speech at work.  
Repeated displays of nooses, combined with racial slurs, can 
cost employers millions of dollars.  In addition, plaintiff 
lawyers can choose between different venues and legal 
theories to redress this form of discrimination.  These five 
sources probably understate employer expenses related to 
racial harassment because many settlements are never 
published in court records, news accounts, or EEOC press 
releases.  Even the published information in Part IV.B fails 
to disclose employer litigation costs in defending these 
actions, including the possibility of paying plaintiffs’ costs 
and attorneys’ fees.  
 
C. Employer Liability for Disciplining Employees 
for Racial Harassment: Low Risk 
When the EEOC and courts first fashioned a doctrine 
for racial harassment, they agreed that Title VII is violated 
when a working environment is “dominated by racial 
slurs.”174  More recently, the EEOC has expanded these 
                                                          
174   The origin of the racial harassment doctrine is set forth in 
EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381 (D. Minn. 
1980), stating that racial harassment had been recognized for some time 
(citing EEOC Dec. 72-0779, 4 FEP Cases 317 (1971); EEOC Dec. 72-1561, 
4 FEP Cases 852 (1972)). In its earliest formulation, the racial harassment 
doctrine made an employer responsible for maintaining a “‘working 
environment free of racial intimidation,’” and required “‘positive action 
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grounds for racial harassment.175  This policy change likely 
explains why employers have addressed racial harassment 
more aggressively by disciplining offenders.176  
Some terminated employees have offered the 
                                                                                                                             
where positive action is necessary to redress or eliminate employee 
intimidation.’” Id. at 384 (citations omitted). Numerous courts consider 
whether there is a “steady barrage of opprobrious racial” comment or 
comments to determine if there is race discrimination. E.g., Schwapp v. 
Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997); Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 
F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir. 1994); Ways v. City of Lincoln, 871 F.2d 750, 754 
(8th Cir. 1989); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987); 
and Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1981). At 
the state level, see Valcarcel v. First Quality Maint., 2013 WL 5832545, at 
*9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013). 
175   See EEOC Compliance Manual, stating: 
Racial harassment is unwelcome conduct that 
unreasonably interferes with an individual's 
work performance or creates an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive work environment. 
Examples of harassing conduct include: offensive 
jokes, slurs, epithets or name calling, physical 
assaults or threats, intimidation, ridicule or 
mockery, insults or put-downs, offensive objects 
or pictures, and interference with work 
performance. An employer may be held liable for 
the harassing conduct of supervisors, coworkers, 
or non-employees (such as customers or business 
associates) over whom the employer has control.  
And see Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Compliance 
Manual (Apr. 19, 2006), available at https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-
color.pdf. The EEOC also expands on this statement of policy by giving 
examples in a question-and-answer format. See Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, Questions and Answers About Race and Color 
Discrimination in Employment, available at 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_race_color.html 
[https://perma.cc/4A7Q-M492] under the heading “Harassment.” 
176 Harberson v. Monsanto Textiles Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) 99, 1976 WL 720 (D.S.C. 1976) (termination due to membership in 
the KKK, and expressing racist statements at work, do not violate Title 
VII). Cf., Contreras, 565 P.2d 1173 (employer took no corrective action 
when Mexican-American employee was subjected to racial jokes, slurs, and 
comments).  
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anachronistic defense that “southerness,”177 “confederate 
southern-american,”178 and “Confederate American”179 are 
forms of national origin, protected from discrimination under 
Title VII.  Others have contended, usually without success, 
that white supremacy is a religion.180  Public employees have 
also asserted constitutional speech or assembly rights, 
mostly without success.181   
                                                          
177 Williams v. Frank, 757 F. Supp. 112, 120 (D. Mass. 1991) 
(“Southerness” not a protected characteristic). 
178  Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(denying claims of national origin and religious discrimination after 
employee was fired for refusing to obey directive not to display 
Confederate flag at work). 
179  Terrill v. Chao, 31 F. App’x 99, 100 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that “Confederate American” is not a protected class, and therefore no 
discrimination in denying request to display materials at a diversity day 
event). 
180  See Storey, 390 F.3d 760 (denying complaint of employee who 
claimed religious discrimination after he was terminated for failing to 
remove Confederate flag stickers on his lunch box); Chaplin v. Du Pont 
Advance Fiber Sys., 293 F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Va. 2003) (no adverse action 
in the form of religious discrimination when company barred Confederate 
imagery in workplace); Swartzentruber v. Gunite Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 
976 (N.D. Ind. 2000); Slater v. King Soopers, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 809 (D. 
Colo. 1992); Bellamy v. Mason’s Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 
1973); and Augustine v. Anti-Defamation League of B’nai-B’rith, 249 
N.W.2d 547 (Wis. 1977). See also EEOC Dec. No. 79-6, 1978 WL 5828, at 
*3 (Oct. 6, 1978), concluding: “Viewing the Klan’s history, its goals and 
purposes, it is apparent that the Klan’s beliefs are more political, social or 
economic than theistic and they do not involve a relation to a superior 
being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation.”  
Cf., Peterson v. Wilmur Commc’ns, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014 
(E.D. Wis. 2002). The court ruled that Peterson’s demotion violated Title 
VII’s prohibition against religious discrimination, noting that Peterson 
never acted in a racially motivated manner while he was employed as a 
supervisor.  
181  Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2002); Allen v. Mich. 
Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 1999); Weicherding v. Riegel, 160 
F.3d 1139 (7th Cir. 1998) (prison sergeant terminated for engaging in 
white supremacist activities and involvement with the Ku Klux Klan); 
McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1985) (sheriff department 
employee also served as organizer for a Ku Klux Klan event); Smith v. 
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Private sector cases are less common because these 
jobs lack the same constitutional protections.  Nonetheless, 
courts have generally upheld an employer’s right to 
discharge an employee for racist speech.182  Paradoxically, 
some white supremacists have alleged a violation of civil 
rights laws. In lawsuits to challenge these firings, courts 
have ruled against Klan members.183 
                                                                                                                             
Town of Hempstead Dep’t of Sanitation Sanitary Dist. No. 2, 798 F. Supp. 
2d 443 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (sanitation department employees alleged that 
noose was displayed); Wilson v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Transp., No. 01-civ-
7398(RJH), 2005 WL 2385866 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Carpenter v. City of 
Tampa, No. 8:03-CV-451- T-17-EAJ, 2005 WL 1463206 (M.D. Fla. 2005); 
Williams v. N.Y.C. Housing Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 820, 824–25 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001).; Lawrenz v. James, 852 F. Supp. 986 (M.D. Fla. 1994); Savina v. 
Gebhart, 497 F. Supp. 65 (D. Md. 1980); Murray v. Jamison, 333 F. Supp. 
1379 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (city wrongfully discharged its employee in violation 
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments for being Grand Dragon of the 
Ku Klux Klan); Essex Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t v. Essex Cty. Corr. Officers 
Ass’n, 27 Mass. L. Rptr. 487 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 2010) (corrections employees 
condoned and encouraged racially harassing posts to union’s website); 
State v. Henderson, 762 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 2009) (state trooper joined the 
Knights Party, a Ku Klux Klan affiliate); Cutler v. Dorn, 955 A.2d 917 
(N.J. App. 2008); in re N.Y.S. Law Enf’t Officers Union, 694 N.Y.S.2d 170; 
Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 706 A.2d 706 (N.J. 1998) (racial epithet by 
off-duty fire fighter uttered at police officer was not protected by the First 
Amendment); and Hawkins v. Dep’t of Public Safety & Corr. Servs., 602 
A.2d 712 (Md. Ct. App. 1992) (corrections officer discharged for off-duty 
anti-Semitic outburst at bank). 
182  Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 2004); 
Webber v. First Student, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (D. Ore. 2013); 
Vanderhoff v. John Deere Consumer Prods., Inc., 21 IER Cases 862, 2003 
WL 23691107 (D.S.C. 2003); and Powell v. Media Gen. Ops., Inc., Civ. A 
No. 7:10-3170-HFF-KFM, 2011 WL 4501836 (D.S.C. 2001) (discharged 
employee’s speech, equating Muslims with terrorism, not protected in 
private workplace).  
183  In Bellamy v. Mason’s Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 
1973), the plaintiff contended that his termination from employment due 
to his affiliation with the United Klans of America, and therefore violated 
his First Amendment rights. Rejecting this view, the court concluded that 
Section 1985(3) does not recognize a right of freedom of association against 
a private actor. See also Savina v. Gebhart, 497 F. Supp. 65 (D. Md. 1980) 
(Section 1985 does not protect speech of a Klan member).  
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D. Conflicting Treatment of Racist Speech: 
Employer Dilemma 
Federal appellate court rulings offer the most direct 
evidence of the growing conflict between the NLRA and Title 
VII in treating racist speech in the workplace.  Four trends 
are discernible in the relationship between courts and the 
NLRB since the Board decided Sewell.  The following 
analysis provides a qualitative complement to the statistical 
charts in Part III.   
The first trend is surprising: After Sewell, the NLRB 
almost always tolerated this type of communication.184  The 
Board did not overturn an election even though the employer 
said that the union tried to force integration “down the 
throats of the people living in the South.”185  Similarly, the 
Board found no problem in “temperate statements with 
racial overtones,” reasoning that employees were free to 
discuss race relations.186  Where a union capitalized on 
                                                          
184  Kresge-Newark, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 869 (1955) (workers were 
able to sift through the employer’s claim that a union official said that the 
company would layoff minority workers unless they had union protection).  
185  Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962), where the 
Board reasoned that the employer’s comments were germane and a matter 
of genuine interest to the white southern workers whom the union was 
attempting to organize. See also N.L.R.B. v. Bush Hog, Inc., 405 F.2d 755, 
757, n.2 (5th Cir. 1968 (employer’s statement that union donated funds to 
further racial integration did not warrant reversal of union election as a 
bargaining representative). 
186  N.L.R.B. v. Balt. Luggage Co., 387 F.2d 744, 746 (4th Cir. 
1967). Campaign messages that related to minority employee concerns 
about unfair treatment did not violate the NLRA because this 
communication “was no gospel of hate.” Id. at 747. Where African-
American employees perceived selective enforcement of rules by their 
employer, the appeals court concluded: “Rather than appealing to deep-
seated emotional fears, the letter and speeches temperately addressed 
themselves to the economic and social self-interest of the workers, over 
ninety percent of whom were Negro. Such an exhortation must be a 
legitimate tactic in any pre-election campaign.” Id.  
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tensions in a workplace between blacks and Hispanics, the 
Board did not overturn an election.187  The NLRB tolerated 
racial remarks if they were used casually.188  In a similar 
vein, racial epithets did not result in setting aside an election 
where they were “common usage” and without any proof of 
racial animosity.189  Inflammatory race appeals in speeches 
and leaflets did not invalidate an election;190 nor did 
expression of religious prejudice.191  The Board declined to 
set aside an election in which a supervisor said that a 
potential union representative “did not like blacks.”192  
Innuendo suggesting that managers are racists did not 
overturn election results.193  Nor did a union’s mention that 
                                                          
187 Family Serv. Agency S.F. v. N.L.R.B., 163 F.3d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). 
188 Englewood Hosp., 318 N.L.R.B. 806, 807 (1995). 
189 N.L.R.B. v. Foundry Div. of Alcon Indus., Inc., 260 F.3d 631, 
635 (6th Cir. 2001). Apart from campaign messages, a workplace climate 
where racial slurs are common will not result in the NLRB overturning an 
election in the absence of persuasion “to vote for or against a union on the 
basis of invidious prejudices.” Id. at 637. 
190  See N.L.R.B. v. HeartShare Human Servs. of N.Y., Inc., 108 
F.3d 467 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that a union’s references to a “racists 
empire (sic),” “slaves in the cotton fields,” and “apartheid” did not 
undermine the fairness of the election). Cf. Newark Portfolio JV, LLC v. 
N.L.R.B., 658 F. App’x 649 (3d Cir. 2016) (denying enforcement to NLRB 
order certifying a union, where an unknown person during the 
representation election may have shouted, in reference to the company’s 
owners, “These Jews don’t care about you, they only care about the 
money.”). 
191  N.L.R.B. v. Carl Weissman & Sons, Inc., 849 F.2d 449, 450 
(9th Cir. 1988) (union official told employees that “the Weissmans were 
pretty stingy with their wages and they had the right kind of background 
for being stingy”). 
192  Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 232 N.L.R.B. 717, 718 (1977) 
(comment by supervisor was “temperately presented and . . . fairly capable 
of evaluation by eligible voters”). 
193  See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Utell Int’l, Inc., 750 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 
1984) (holding that the representation election was not tainted by 
employee misrepresentations of racial prejudice). The issue of racially-
charged communication was not discussed in the NLRB’s decision, Utell 
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the employer is racist.194  The fact that union organizers 
played up the “pro-black protection sentiments” of the 
workforce was not inflammatory.195  In a mostly black 
workforce, the union’s intentional exclusion of whites from 
the campaign did not overturn an election.196  A union’s 
comparison of management to Hitler was not sufficiently 
inflammatory under Sewell to void election results.197  
Taking the totality of these rulings—all of which 
occurred after Sewell’s policy for regulating racially 
inflammatory speech—the Board showed no ability to 
distinguish between epithets and stray remarks, on the one 
hand, and slurs that aimed to bait and divide workers along 
racial and ethnic lines, on the other.  In short, the first 
observable trend is that the NLRB’s Sewell policy is rarely 
enforced.  The policy is virtually meaningless. 
In a second trend, federal appeals courts 
                                                                                                                             
Int’l, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (1984); but the appellate court took up the 
issue. See also Zartic, Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 495, 496 (1994) (union falsely 
accused employer of giving money to the Ku Klux Klan).  
194  Beatrice Grocery Prods., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 31 (1989) (NLRB 
found that Union’s one-time remarks criticizing the company’s racism was 
not a central part of the campaign). The order was enforced in Martha 
White Foods, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 872 F.2d 1026 (6th Cir. 1989).  
195  N.L.R.B. v. Bancroft Mfg. Co., Inc., 516 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
196  N.L.R.B. v. Hood Furniture Mfg. Co., 941 F.2d 325, 330–31 
(5th Cir. 1991).   
197  Arlington Hotel Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 712 F.2d 333, 338 (8th 
Cir. 1983). The court explained: 
The Hitler and slave ship references at issue 
were found by the Regional Director to fall 
outside the Sewell standard. Sewell does not 
require that all racial references be excluded 
from a campaign, but is concerned with appeals 
to animosity and prejudice. The slave ship 
reference, although having racial overtones, was 
directed at economic, not racial, oppression. The 
Hotel replied to the slave ship reference with 
statements about increased employees’ benefits 
and improved conditions. 
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demonstrated more concern for prejudicial comments than 
the NLRB.198  In these cases, the Board certified a union’s 
election or ordered a company to bargain with a union 
without mentioning any controversy about race.  But as the 
following discussion shows, appellate courts delved into the 
record and cited racial slurs during campaigns as reasons to 
deny enforcement to these orders.   
● Third Circuit Court of Appeals: The NLRB in 
Silverman’s Men’s Wear, Inc. ordered an employer to bargain 
with a union, without mentioning a slur during the union’s 
organizing campaign. 199  On appeal, the Third Circuit denied 
enforcement to the Board’s order, noting that a union 
representative told employees that a company officer is a 
“stingy Jew.”200 
● Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals: In Schapiro & 
                                                          
198  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals provided an exception to 
the trend in appellate rejection of the NLRB’s permissive application of 
Sewell. The Board ordered the company to bargain with the union in Did 
Building Services, 291 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (1988). The NLRB case made no 
mention of employer objections to racially-themed campaigning in behalf 
of the union. The Ninth Circuit enforced the Board’s order, explaining that 
an employee’s slurs against “gringos and Jews” were “vile and seething 
with prejudice” but did not warrant invalidation of the election. Did Bldg. 
Servs., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 915 F.2d 490, 499 (9th Cir. 1990). The court 
concluded that isolated appeals to prejudice must be left to voters’ “good 
sense and judgment.” Id.  See also Case Farms of N.C., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 
128 F.3d 841, 845 (4th Cir.1997), where the Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
NLRB’s decision not to overturn an election where appeals to racial 
prejudice were part of an effort to air workplace grievances or other work-
related issues. The company objected to the union’s misleading and false 
statement that the company fired Amish workers from its Ohio plant. Id. 
at 844. The court rejected the Company’s argument that Sewell disallowed 
appeals to ‘“ethnocentric fears.”’ Id. at 845. The court said, in response, ‘“If 
. . . racial or sexual remarks . . . do not form the core or theme of the 
campaign . . . and if the remarks are not inflammatory, they should be 
reviewed [only] under the standards applied to other types of 
misrepresentation (quotation and citation omitted).”’  
199  250 N.L.R.B. No. 181 (1980). 
200  N.L.R.B. v. Silverman’s Men’s Wear, Inc., 656 F.2d 53, 55 (3d 
Cir.1981). 
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Whitehouse, Inc., the Board ordered the employer to bargain 
with a union, dismissing the employer’s concern that the 
union circulated leaflets that appealed to racial prejudice.201  
Denying enforcement to the order, the Fourth Circuit applied 
Sewell to reject the Union’s incitements to a mostly black 
workforce.202 
●   Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: The NLRB in 
Carrington South Health Care Center found that a union was 
properly certified as a bargaining representative after an 
election.203  The Sixth Circuit denied enforcement, citing 
evidence that union cartoons used “obvious images of 
bondage or violence visited upon racial minorities by a white 
majority.”204  The NLRB in Eurodrive, Inc. ordered the 
employer to bargain with a union following a representation 
election, notwithstanding the employer’s contention that the 
union instigated racial harassment.205  In denying 
enforcement,206 the court cited information that the Board 
omitted from its decision— the union organizer told white 
employees that they “needed the Union to protect their jobs 
because white employees were not protected by the equal 
opportunity laws.” 207  The Board in KI (USA) Corp. ordered 
                                                          
201  148 N.L.R.B. 958 (1964). 
202  N.L.R.B. v. Schapiro & Whitehouse, Inc., 356 F.2d 675, 679 
(4th Cir. 1966) (stating that “[f]or the union to call upon racial pride or 
prejudice in the contest could ‘have no purpose except to inflame the racial 
feelings of voters in the election.’ Besides their utter irrelevance, the 
leaflets appear to this court as highly inflammatory . . . The reliance upon 
race inhibited a ‘sober, informed exercise of the franchise’ and was 
altogether out of place.”). 
203  314 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (1994).  
204  Carrington S. Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 76 F.3d 802, 
807 (6th Cir. 1996) (union cartoons also showed a group of workers labor 
as “beasts of burden, pulling their superiors in a wagon while being 
whipped; a black worker is to be summarily executed by a white overlord”). 
205  N.L.R.B. v. Eurodrive, Inc., 60 N.L.R.B. 1466 (1982). 
206  724 F.2d 556, 559 (6th Cir. 1984). 
207  Id. at 557 (the court found that this communication was an 
appeal to racial prejudice). 
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the Company to bargain with the Union following an 
election.208  The NLRB certified the union’s election, 
reasoning that the letter was not “intended to generate a 
general racially-based hostility against Japanese 
nationals.”209  However, the Sixth Circuit refused to enforce 
the Board’s order, citing the Union’s circulation of a letter at 
a Japanese-owned company that communicated a Japanese 
businessman’s view that American workers are lazy.210 
● Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals: In Triplex 
Manufacturing Co., the NLRB ordered business owners to 
bargain with a union.211  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit in 
NLRB v. Katz212 denied enforcement, citing a union rally 
where a priest said the owners “are Jewish and they’re 
getting rich while we’re getting poor,”213 and “why should we 
make them rich because Jewish people are rich and we are 
poor and killing ourselves for them.”214  
● Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals: The Board 
in M & M Supermarkets, Inc., never mentioned racist 
communications in the election process.215 On appeal, 
                                                          
208  KI (USA) Corp., 309 N.L.R.B. 1063 (1992). 
209  Id. at 1066. 
210  KI (USA) Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 35 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 1994). In an 
unusual development, the court explicitly stated that the Midland 
standard is the “wrong one to apply” where racially inflammatory speech 
is used. Id. at 260. The court held that “the truthfulness of racially-related 
remarks is the type of ‘other campaign conduct’ to which the lenient 
Midland standard of truthfulness, by its own terms, does not apply.” Id. 
The court adopted the dissenting view in the NLRB decision that the 
union’s “negative stereotyping” of the Japanese has no place in an NLRB 
election. Id. Compare N.L.R.B. v. DPM of Kansas, Inc., 744 F.2d 83, 86 
(10th Cir. 1984) (“elections will not be set aside because of misleading 
campaign statements, absent the use of forged documents or the alteration 
of an official Board document in a manner suggesting that the Board 
favors one of the parties”).  
211  251 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (1980). 
212  701 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1983). 
213  Id. at 705. 
214  Id.  
215  280 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (1986). 
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however, the Eleventh Circuit denied enforcement to the 
NLRB’s order, noting that an employee said, “Blacks were 
out in the cotton field while they, the damned Jews, took 
their money from the poor hardworking people.”216 
The third trend shows that appellate courts are 
divided in applying Sewell’s framework where the speaker is 
a third party (not formally with a union or an employer).  
Third parties include employees who support or oppose a 
union, or an outside organization.217  In one view, the 
Seventh Circuit applied the Sewell framework, regardless of 
third party status, provided that prejudicial communications 
impair the employees’ freedom of choice in an NLRB 
election.218  The fact that the speaker is not the union or the 
employer is immaterial: the determinant is whether an 
inflammatory “remark prejudiced the outcome of the 
election.”219  
The Ninth, Eleventh, and Fourth Circuits have 
differed by requiring more proof that the communication 
tainted the election with intolerable prejudice.220  The 
                                                          
216  M & M Supermarkets, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 818 F.2d 1567, 1569 
(11th Cir.1987). 
217  N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 701 F.2d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1983) (Catholic 
priest who made anti-Semitic comments about the company’s owners 
during an organizing meeting was a third party).    
218  Id. at 706–07. 
219  Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a priest’s anti-
Semitic characterization of the company’s owners, expressed at a union 
meeting attended by a mostly Catholic workforce, was evidence that the 
election was swayed by these slurs. Id. at 708. 
220  This is because unions and employers are unable to control 
the communications of individual employees (speaking as co-workers) or 
outsiders, such as community leaders. See Did Bldg. Servs. v. N.L.R.B., 
915 F.2d 490, 498 (9th Cir. 1990), involving religious and ethnic slurs by 
an employee who was also union organizer (“the Jewish gringos were 
exploiting us”). The court said that an election should be invalidated only 
if a third-party’s “appeal to prejudice … so taint[ed] the election 
atmosphere as to render free choice of representation impossible.” Id. at 
498. In another case, a union supporter—speaking as an employee and not 
an officer of the union—referred to the company’s owners as “the damn 
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finding for these circuits is significant in view of the 
increasing activism of white supremacy groups in protests 
and political campaigns.  These courts effectively open the 
door for racist grievances in union representation elections 
insofar as effective racist appeals can be subtle, cleverly 
symbolic, or communicated on private and disguised social 
media platforms.  Subtlety and privacy can protect racism 
                                                                                                                             
Jews who run this company.” M & M Supermarkets, 818 F.2d at 1572. 
Denying enforcement to the NLRB’s bargaining order, the Eleventh 
Circuit said that third-party appeals to prejudice will invalidate an 
election if they “destroyed the atmosphere necessary to the exercise of a 
free choice in the representation election.”  
More recently, in Ashland Facility Operations, LLC v. N.L.R.B., 
the Fourth Circuit joined these appellate courts, reasoning that “were we 
to apply the Sewell burden-shifting approach, it would create the absurd 
result that a party would bear the burden of defending the veracity and 
relevance of comments made by an entity not party to the case and for 
which it was not responsible.” 701 F.3d 983, 993 (4th Cir. 2012). 
But see the dissenting opinion in N.L.R.B. v. Flambeau Airmold 
Corp., 178 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999), upholding a vote for a union 
notwithstanding a damaging and false rumor. There, Judge Niemeyer 
noted: 
The misconduct in this case—a false accusation, 
circulated on the eve of the representation 
election, that a manager referred to the 
employees as “a bunch of niggers”—was most 
clearly an accusation of racial bigotry. It was 
directed at management; it was an attempt to 
win the election by creating animosity along 
racial lines; and it was an attempt “to divert the 
employer from legitimate issues by insinuating 
an irrelevant appeal to race.” 
A better approach, according to Judge Niemeyer, “would require a new 
representation election based on third-party race-based inflammatory 
conduct when (1) the conduct was of the type that would pollute the 
atmosphere necessary for the exercise of free choice, and (2) the overall 
circumstances suggest that, more likely than not, the conduct altered the 
outcome of the election.” Id. at 715. 
 See also Rheem Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 28 F.3d 1210 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(union supporter started false rumor that company promoted a white 
employee as a supervisor, a matter that was discussed by more senior 
black employees).   
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when courts use a high proof standard of intolerable 
prejudice.  
The fourth trend is found in federal court rulings on 
racist speech that occurs on picket lines, not representation 
elections or organizing campaigns.  Recent courts have 
observed the conflict between Title VII’s dictates for a 
workplace free of racial harassment, and the NLRB’s 
emphasis on protecting slurs during heated labor disputes.221  
This problem is illustrated in Detroit Newspaper 
Agency, where the Board ordered reinstatement for a striker 
whose racist slurs and personal threats were directed at an 
employee who crossed a picket line.222  The NLRB also 
ordered reinstatement of a striker in Airo Die Casting, Inc. 
who approached a replacement worker with both middle 
fingers extended while screaming “fuck you, nigger.”223  In 
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, where picketing strikers 
shouted racial taunts Black replacement workers, the NLRB 
ordered the company to rehire an offending employee who 
was fired under its EEO policy.224  
                                                          
221  Polynesian Hospitality Tours, 297 N.L.R.B. 228, 252 (1989) 
(employees engaged in protected concerted activity with “use of epithets, 
vulgar words, profanity, vulgar gestures, and the like”); and Cont’l Can 
Co., Inc., 291 N.L.R.B. 290 (1988) (discharge due to racially insulting 
comments was actually motivated by employee’s pro-union comments, and 
employer had previously tolerated racial slurs).  
222 342 N.L.R.B. 223 (2004). A woman who was working during 
the strike had her car blocked by two picketers at which point one striker 
said, “You fuckin’ bitch, nigger lovin’ whore. It’s your fault that white 
America lost their jobs. Your family is going to die. I hope you tell your 
children before they die that its (sic) your fault and its (sic) because you 
gave our jobs away.” Id. at 268. 
223   347 N.L.R.B. 810, 811 (2006). The Board reasoned that 
striker’s “use of obscene language and gestures and a racial slur, standing 
alone without any threats or violence, did not rise to the level where he 
forfeited the protection of the Act.” Id. 
224   866 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 2017) (striker called out, “Did you 
bring enough KFC for everybody?” and “Hey, anybody smell that? I smell 
fried chicken and watermelon.” After that comment, an unidentified 
picketer shouted, “go back to Africa, you bunch of f***ing losers.”).  
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But two courts have taken note of the conflict between 
Title VII’s proscription of racial harassment and the NLRB’s 
anachronistic acquiescence to it.  A jury in Dowd v. United 
Steelworkers of America found that a striking union created 
a hostile work environment under Title VII for employees 
who were subjected to a continuing stream of racial slurs and 
physical threats.225  And a recent federal appeals court 
decision, Consolidated Communications, Inc. v. NLRB,226 
reached a similar conclusion. Judge Millett’s concurring 
opinion offers a fitting summation of the growing conflict 
between NLRA and Title VII cases: 
I write separately, though, to convey my 
substantial concern with the too-often cavalier 
and enabling approach that the Board’s 
decisions have taken toward the sexually and 
racially demeaning misconduct of some 
employees during strikes. Those decisions have 
repeatedly given refuge to conduct that is not 
only intolerable by any standard of decency, 
but also illegal in every other corner of the 
workplace. The sexually and racially 
disparaging conduct that Board decisions have 
winked away encapsulates the very types of 
demeaning and degrading messages that for 
too much of our history have trapped women 
and minorities in a second-class workplace 
status.227 
                                                          
225  253 F.3d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 2001). 
226  837 F.3d 1, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (admonishing the NLRB not to 
assume that “the use of abusive language, vulgar expletives, and racial 
epithets” between employees “is part and parcel of the vigorous exchange 
that often accompanies labor relations.”).  
227 Id. at 20–21. Against the backdrop of Judge Millet’s 
concurrence, several NLRB rulings have taken the stance she advocates. 
Notably, however, many of these are older cases. E.g., Old Town Shoe Co., 
91 N.L.R.B. 240, 273–74 (1950) (NLRB denied reinstatement to striker 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The NLRB should revise its speech doctrine for 
representation elections to remove legal protection for racist 
speech that meets the standard for hostile work environment 
under Title VII.  In particular, the NLRB should apply 
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. by considering the “frequency 
of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive 
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 
employee’s work performance.”228  Labor and employment 
law should not be judicially segregated so that racist speech 
is protected under the NLRA while triggering liability under 
Title VII for employers.  
But there is more to this research.  When the NLRB 
tolerates racist speech in representation elections, this 
normalizes an atmosphere of union organizing or employer 
resistance to unionizing that was typical when white workers 
fought racial integration.229  Turning to strikes where 
replacements are hired, employers take advantage of 
economic inequality.230  This often means that Blacks, 
                                                                                                                             
who told a co-worker, while picketing, that “it is too bad Hitler couldn’t 
have lasted a couple of more years. He’d have gotten rid of all the goddam 
Jews”); Nassau Ins. Co., 280 N.L.R.B. 878, 894 (1986) ( “[T]he use of racial 
and religious epithets [by striking employees is] unlikely to be forgotten or 
forgiven after the strike is over, thus leading to potentially disruptive 
conditions in the workplace if the [offending employee] were [reinstated]”); 
and Avondale Indus., 333 N.L.R.B. 622, 637–38 (2001) (employer lawfully 
discharged union activist who had unfounded concern that her foreman 
was a Klansman, where employer concerned about the disruption her 
remark would cause in the workplace).  
228  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). 
229  DuBois, supra note 23. 
230  A detailed case study is published in Timothy J. Minchin, 
Torn Apart: Permanent Replacements and the Crossett Strike of 1985, 59 
ARK. HIST. Q. 30, 43 (2000) (“replacement workers claimed that they were 
motivated primarily by the high wages and good benefits” that were once 
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Hispanics, and immigrants are hired to break strikes by 
white employees.231  In this explosive environment, the 
NLRB takes an antiquated view that picketers should be 
legally protected when they resort to racist taunts and 
ridicule. Given that many strikes end with employers 
retaining replacement workers,232 the Board’s current policy 
adds fuel to divisive employer strategy by affording legal 
protection to strikers who transmute an economic dispute 
into a racial confrontation.233   
My policy proposal is supported by empirical evidence 
showing that the NLRB ignores its own policy against racist 
speech in Sewell; and these findings align with a growing 
body of rulings from federal appeals courts.  Critics of my 
proposal may complain that having a unity of speech policy 
between the NLRA and Title VII would create a civility code 
                                                                                                                             
paid to strikers). 
231  Mark Noon, “It Ain’t Your Color, It’s Your Scabbing”; Literary 
Depictions of African American Strikebreakers, 38 AFRICAN AM. REV. 429 
(2004) (reporting contemporaneous written accounts of strikes by whites 
with black replacement workers). Another example of racial cleavage 
appears in United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 
610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983), where white union members 
attacked black workers, hired from outside the community, to work at a 
construction site.  
232  The striker replacement doctrine, fashioned by the Supreme 
Court in N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345–46 
(1938), allows employers to hire permanent striker replacements without 
violating the NLRA. 
233  An example of this tactic appears in TWA, Inc. v. Independent 
Fed’n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989). During a flight attendants 
strike, the airline lures strikers to abandon the picket line by promising 
these crossovers a seniority advantage over strikers, thereby improving job 
and domicile assignments. Criticizing the majority’s reason that this tactic 
did not undermine the right to strike, Justice Brennan reasoned: “More 
fundamental, I fear, is the legal mistake inherent in the Court’s objection 
to ‘penalizing those who decided not to strike in order to benefit those who 
did.’ The Court, of course, does precisely the opposite: it allows TWA to 
single out for penalty precisely those employees who were faithful to the 
strike until the end, in order to benefit those who abandoned it.” Id. at 
447. 
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in representation elections.  Elections, they may argue, 
should be free-wheeling, uncensored forums for all 
viewpoints.  This would miss the point, however, that a 
workplace election is not the same as an election for public 
office.  While a racist can be elected as president, a union or 
employer cannot run on a platform of white separatism or 
racial preference without creating liability under Title VII.  
A free speech approach would also overlook the fact that 
mere epithets and stray remarks do not constitute verbal 
harassment under Title VII.  Instead, speech must be 
sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter conditions of 
employment.  
Other critics may point out that employers already 
have a psychological advantage over union organizers 
because they can hold captive audience speeches that sow 
fear and anxiety over losing jobs if employees elect a union 
as a bargaining agent.  Why shouldn’t a union organizer, or 
union-busting management consultant, be able to tap into 
employee anxieties over immigration and race?  My study 
answers this question by proposing Title VII’s harassment 
standard, which has been accepted without significant 
controversy for over twenty years.  If a union organizer or 
management consultant cannot hang nooses or use racial 
epithets in their own employment relationship without 
facing legal consequences, why should their campaign 
speeches that use or lead to these incitements be protected 
under the NLRA?  My proposal not only limits the worst type 
of union election speech, but would focus campaigns on 
economics and the benefits and drawbacks of having union 
representation.  Without making this policy change, the 
NLRA will shield racist grievances by employees and race-
baiting by employers, opening the door to re-segregating the 
American workplace.  
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